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PREFACE
In his introduction to the September 2002 National Security
Strategy of the United States, President George W. Bush wrote,
“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that
they are seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and evidence
indicates that they are doing so with determination. . . . Terrorists
are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of
modern technologies against us.”
Iran is the poster-child for the nexus of terrorism and WMD. It
is the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism, as well as one of
the countries most actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Washington
is vigilant about Iran’s support for a network of Islamist terrorist
organizations and persistent in pressing Iran to end its financial,
political, material, and operational support to them. At the same
time, the United States has to come up with effective strategies to
ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. Were Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons, there is a grave risk it would be tempted
to provide them to terrorists. After all, mass casualty terrorism done
by proxies has worked well for Iran to date. Iranian assistance to
the terrorists who blew up the U.S. and French barracks in Beirut in
1983 was a grand strategic success, forcing the United States, and for
a while France, out of Lebanon while not bringing any retaliation
down on Iran. Similarly, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers
barracks in Saudi Arabia caused the Saudis to make a strategic
reconciliation, and, once again, Iran faced no retaliation.
The fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by
the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear
weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran’s nuclear program is by
no means obvious. Unlike proliferators such as Israel or Pakistan,
Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity
to wipe the state off the face of the earth. Iran is encircled by
troubled neighbors, but nuclear weapons do nothing to help counter
the threats that could come from state collapse in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, or Azerbaijan. Instead, Iranian acquisition of nuclear

v

arms could set off a chain reaction―increased U.S. assets directed
against Iran, active Israeli planning for Iran contingencies, and quite
possibly nuclear proliferation by Iranian neighbors such as Saudi
Arabia and Turkey―which would leave Iran worse off than if it had
never developed nuclear arms. Instead of starting an arms race that
it is certain to lose, Iran would be much better off strategically if it
pressed for agreements to limit arms throughout the Gulf: to restrict
the size of the new Iraqi army, to freeze and reduce the size of the
Arab Gulf monarchies’ militaries, and to phase down the size of the
U.S. force in the area. However, Iran’s leaders seem remarkably
impervious to careful strategic thinking about international security;
put another way, perhaps they are more driven by considerations of
national prestige or domestic politics.
Hopefully European and American leaders will agree on how to
proceed about Iran’s nuclear program. To date, European leaders
seem to concentrate on significant incentives (“bigger carrots”) for
responsible behavior to the near exclusion of threatening painful,
punitive measures (“bigger sticks”) for continued irresponsible
behavior, while Americans do the reverse. It would be progress
if each side more openly acknowledged that the most promising
approach combines both carrots and sticks, and if each side
more bluntly stated that it was prepared to consider using both
instruments. That said, it is at least possible that, in the end, Europe
will take the lead in offering Iran incentives while the United States
takes the lead in threatening punitive measures.
Achieving trans-Atlantic consensus on how to respond to Iran’s
nuclear program will be difficult. This is a remarkably bad time
for the international community to face the Iran nuclear problem,
because the tensions about the Iraq WMD issue still poison relations
and weaken U.S. ability to respond. Nevertheless, Iran’s nuclear
program poses a stark challenge to the international nonproliferation
regime. The intelligence about the Iran threat is coming from a United
Nations agency―namely, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)―and there is no doubt that Iran is developing worrisome
capabilities. If the world community led by Western countries is
unable to prevent Iranian proliferation, then it is unclear that there is
much meaning to global nonproliferation norms.

vi

Iran’s nuclear program raises stark shortcomings with the global
nonproliferation norms. The basic deal behind the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is that countries are
allowed to acquire a wide range of troubling capabilities in return
for being open and transparent. The NPT gives Iran every right to
have a full closed fuel cycle, with large uranium enrichment facilities
and a reprocessing plant that can extract substantial amounts of
plutonium―capabilities which would permit Iran at any time to
rapidly “break out” of the NPT, building a considerable number of
nuclear weapons in a short time. Had Iran been fully transparent
about its nuclear activities, then even if Iran had gone so far as to
operate a full closed fuel cycle, the international community would
have been split deeply about how to react. It is fortunate indeed that
Iran decided to cheat on its NPT obligations by hiding some of what
is doing, because that has made much easier the construction of an
international consensus that Iran’s nuclear program is troubling. But
the experience with Iran should lead to reflection about whether the
basic NPT deal needs to be revisited.

PATRICK CLAWSON
Deputy Director
Washington Institute for
Near East Policy
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INTRODUCTION
Henry Sokolski
Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might
question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is
simply one that’s come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to
when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do
it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do
so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast:
If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on
its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in
the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no
longer a credible strategy.
The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not
any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper
goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran
from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program,
etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted
(including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran’s
example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran
will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by
enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out
the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weaponsrelated capabilities.
The book’s seven chapters were commissioned as the first of a
two-part Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) project
on Iran supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and the
Office of Net Assessment within the Department of Defense. The
project’s interim conclusions and policy recommendations are
contained in this book’s first chapter, “Checking Iran’s Nuclear
Ambitions.” The key point made here is that whatever is done to keep
Iran from proceeding with its nuclear program should be done with
a eye toward deterring other states, including Iran’s neighbors, from
following Tehran’s example of using the NPT and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to get within weeks of having a large
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arsenal of nuclear weapons. The details of just how Iran has been
able to do this are spelled out in the book’s second chapter, “Iran’s
‘Legal’ Paths to the Bomb,” by former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commissioner Victor Gilinsky. In this chapter, Mr. Gilinsky details
how Iran can use Bushehr and its “civilian” uranium enrichment
program to come within weeks of having dozens of bombs even
while being intrusively inspected by the IAEA.
Would Iran ever actually deploy nuclear weapons though?
Much depends on one’s read of just how long-lived and truculent
the current regime is. These issues are taken up in the volume’s
next two chapters. In “Iran’s Internal Struggles,” Genieve Abdo, an
internationally recognized observer of Iranian politics, argues that
the revolutionary government is unlikely to be overthrown anytime
soon and that it will persist in its hostile foreign policies. Rob Sobhani,
a leading American-Iranian commentator, however, argues that
with sufficient U.S. support of the right sort, the current government
in Iran could give way to a far more liberal and peaceable regime.
But what is the “right” kind of support? Abbas William Samii, Radio
Free Europe’s Iranian broadcast analyst, explores this question in
chapter 5, “Winning Iranian Hearts and Minds.” Although Mr.
Samii does not rule out speedy regime change, he warns that it is
not likely and that for that reason, the United States needs to have
a long-term outreach program that will encourage a more favorable
opinion of the United States among the general Iranian population.
This, then, raises the question of timing. If favorable regime
change may not come before Iran acquires nuclear weapons or the
ability to quickly acquire them, what other course of action might the
United States and its allies take to influence Iranian decisionmakers?
One course would be to try to cut Iran a deal. As former U.S. National
Security Council staffer and Nixon Center Middle East expert
Geoffrey Kemp explains in chapter 6, the history of such efforts
has been mixed. Mr. Kemp, though, argues that circumstances now
might actually be ripe for fruitful negotiations. And what if they are
not? In the book’s final chapter, Michael Eisenstadt, the Washington
Institute’s Gulf security analyst, raises the veil on what might be the
last resort--military action. In his chapter, “The Challenges of U.S.
Preventive Military Action,” Mr. Eisenstadt details the various risks

x

associated with both overt and covert military attacks against Iran’s
nuclear program.
None of the most popular policy options, in short, are sure bets;
all are fraught with dangers. This is why it is critical to make sure
that Iran at least understands that it will not be rewarded or given
a pass on its pursuit of worrisome nuclear activities. In the first
instance this means that the United States and its allies must make
full use of existing restraints against nuclear weapons proliferation-the IAEA and the NPT--to make sure Iran does not become a model
of how to exploit the rules, but rather an example of what happens
to states that bend or flaunt them. Beyond this, the United States
and its allies must make clear what Iran can expect if it continues its
nuclear power program--even if within the legal letter of the IAEA
Statute--and how much better Iran’s future would be if it terminated
its program and cut its ties to terrorists, who might otherwise gain
access to the nuclear know-how Iran has already mastered.
In the end, of course, diplomacy is meaningless unless it is backed
by the prospect of force. Cooperative military planning, creating new
security arrangements, covert military actions, defense cooperation
and transfers that are aimed at limiting the harm Iran’s nuclear
activities might otherwise pose will all soon become urgent matters.
What specifically needs to be done will be more fully detailed upon
completion of this project’s second phase, later in 2004.
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CHAPTER 1
CHECKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS:
REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Project on Iran
This report is based on commissioned research and commentary
of over 30 of the nation’s leading experts on Iran and nuclear
proliferation. It was over a year in the making. Unlike most analyses,
which have focused solely on the immediate worry of Iran going
nuclear, it sees Iran’s nuclear program as a persistent danger and
catalyst for other states to acquire nuclear weapons options of their
own. These nuclear programs along with Iran’s would confront
the United States and its allies with intolerable long-term security
dangers. The report supports neither overt military action against
Iran’s nuclear facilities nor trying to cut a deal with Iran not to make
nuclear weapons. Instead, it makes three recommendations, none of
which U.S. or allied officials have yet fully adopted:
1. Challenge Iran’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) noncompliance
as being decisive to the future of nuclear nonproliferation. If Iran
succeeds in coming within weeks of being able to breakout of the
NPT and quickly acquire nuclear weapons, it will demonstrate
to the world (and every other nation that might want nuclear
weapons) how any state can use the NPT to get the bombmaking
capabilities it wants. Unlike what happened with Iraq or North
Korea, then, the United States and other like-minded nations
need to enforce and amplify the NPT to curb Iran before it
acquires more than a bomb’s worth of separated plutonium
or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Toward this end, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be urged to
follow the requirements of its charter and at least file an interim
report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) about the
known technical IAEA violations Iran has itself admitted to, and
highlight concerns the IAEA still has about additional Iranian
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weapons-related activities relating to the trace quantities of HEU
that the IAEA has found. In addition, this report should:
•

insist that Iran uphold the freeze on its uranium enrichment
and processing activities that it agreed to October 21 with
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom;

•

establish a reasonable schedule for clarifying the origin of the
trace amounts of the bomb usable HEU the IAEA has found;

•

call on all nations to temporarily suspend any further
nuclear cooperation with Iran until the IAEA can clarify this
matter and establish whether or not Iran has come into full
compliance with the NPT; and,

•

ask the permanent five members of the UNSC (P-5) to agree
to how they would act upon receipt of an IAEA report that
found a member to be not clearly in full compliance with
either its IAEA safeguards agreement or the NPT.

Among the country-neutral resolutions that the P-5 should consider
and urge the UNSC to adopt while the IAEA is evaluating the
evidence concerning Iran’s compliance status are:
•

authorizing UN members to interdict the imports of
any technology, material, or equipment relevant to the
development of nuclear weapons or their means of delivery to
any nation that the IAEA had formally identified as no longer
being clearly in full compliance with its NPT obligations;

•

banning any peaceful nuclear cooperation with such states
the IAEA has identified until the IAEA confirms its full
compliance with the NPT;

•

prohibiting NPT members from withdrawing from the treaty
(i.e., requiring the imposition of all the obligations of the NPT
on all NPT members whether they have been identified by
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the IAEA or not) unless or until they first surrender all of the
nuclear capabilities they previously gained while a member
of the treaty;
•

authorizing the imposition of UN and UN member state
economic penalties against states the IAEA has identified
as no longer clearly being in full compliance with their
NPT obligations on a progressive basis, starting with small
measures (e.g., a ban on loans from international financial
institutions) and escalating to harsher measures; and,

•

creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that above measures
are actually implemented.

The aim of these resolutions (and their development, which would
take several months) would be three-fold. First, their development
and adoption should help deter further violation of the NPT by Iran
and spell out what action the UNSC would take when the IAEA
finally determines Iran’s compliance status. Second, they (and
their country-neutral character) should help deter Iran’s neighbors,
or other nations, who might otherwise be tempted to hedge their
security bets by acquiring a nuclear weapons option of their own.
Third, they should help give the Russians and the Europeans
additional justification for withholding preferential trade and
nuclear cooperation from Iran if it persists in developing a nuclear
weapons option.
Finally, for reasons detailed later in this report, it is clear from
the evidence the IAEA has found already that the agency ultimately
will have to conclude that Iran is no longer clearly in full compliance
with its NPT obligations, i.e., that Iran is in violation. This, in turn,
should trigger the sanction responses detailed above.
2. Encourage Iranians to debate the merits of their nuclear power
program and support of terrorism. The IAEA demands made
of Iran at its last board of governors’ meeting on September 12,
2003, prompted a limited debate. Iranian officials, however, were
not pressed very hard. Although some hardliners still object
to Iran making any concessions, no official has yet conceded
3

that Tehran should give up its enrichment or power reactor
programs. Nor has any Iranian official argued that Iran can do
more than it already has to explain the mysterious HEU traces
IAEA inspectors found. A key reason why more debate has not
been generated in Iran about Tehran’s nuclear policies is that few
in the United States or Europe have insisted that Iran do much
more than minimally satisfy the IAEA. This must change.
First, the more Iranians are pressed on their nuclear policies
and continued support of terrorism, the more likely it is that the
current government will make additional needed concessions.
Second, and more important, the more Iran is pressed on these
issues, the more likely it is that the internal debate it produces
in Iran will itself foster greater firmness within the international
community to press on these matters. This, in turn, will be
critical to warn off other states from ever trying to emulate
Iran’s example. Of course, those that want to work with the
revolutionary government in Iran claim that is what they are
trying to accomplish by offering to cut Tehran a deal―i.e., to give
it benefits up front in exchange for promises of better Iranian
behavior later. The history of the last 2 decades of such deal
making, however, is a story of time invested with little to show
in return. In the case of deal making over Iran’s nuclear program,
the time lost, moreover, will only bring Iran closer to acquiring
bombs. Instead of taking this approach, then, the United States
and its allies should make it clear to Iranians what they can
expect the costs and benefits will be to their country of pursing
alternative nuclear foreign policies. Specifically, after the P-5
considers the country-neutral proliferation-related resolutions
noted above, and the IAEA and the UNSC sanction Iran, the
United States and its friends should highlight the prospect of Iran
having to engage in a competition against most of its neighbors
and the world and contrast this with the benefits Iran could
expect to receive if it relinquished its nuclear power program
and cut its ties with terrorist organizations. Tehran should
be told that if it fails to follow up its latest October 21, 2003,
pledge to suspend its enrichment of uranium with verifiable
moves to dismantle its nuclear power program, it will risk being
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further isolated economically, diplomatically, and militarily.
Conversely, the major powers should make it clear that Iran can
expect to receive security guarantees, an end to U.S. sanctions,
and access to high technology and international capital markets
if Iran dismantles all of its nuclear power-related facilities (i.e.,
all but its small research reactor facilities) and ends its support
of terrorist organizations. The deadlines for Tehran taking these
remedial actions should be early and clear―i.e., well before Iran
could possibly acquire its first bomb―within 24 months or less.
At the same time and to assure this explanation has credibility
among Iranian reformers, the United States should launch
additional long-term initiatives to undermine the revolutionary
government’s efforts to demonize America. These initiatives
should include more creative forms of outreach as well as direct
forms of relief such as increased disaster relief and public health
assistance.
3. If Iran continues to pursue worrisome nuclear activities,
ramp up U.S. and allied military regional capabilities both to
neutralize the Iranian threat and forestall further proliferation.
The United States and the military coalition in Iraq already must
guarantee Iraq’s security against a potentially hostile Iran. The
United States and its key allies are also committed to interdicting
commerce in nuclear weapons-related items to trouble states
like Iran under the Proliferation Security Initiative. Beyond this,
the United States and its key allies ought to consult with the
Gulf Coordination Council states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and
Egypt about what these nations’ military plans are for coping
with a militant, nuclear (or near-nuclear) Iran. Plans should be
prepared now on how additional military cooperation (including
intelligence sharing, missile defense cooperation, joint training,
base sharing agreements, etc.) might best counter the threat and
what new security arrangements, if any, would be appropriate.
Details on these issues will be developed as a part of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center’s (NPEC) planned
follow on study, which will be completed in 2004.
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Principal Assumptions.
Some may see these recommendations as harsh. Given what the
IAEA has learned about Iran’s nuclear weapons effort, though, the
urgency of addressing Iran’s possible breakout has clearly increased.
Stunned earlier this year by the discovery of several new nuclear
production facilities, trace quantities of highly enriched uranium,
and Iran’s admission to making uranium metal and importing
significant quantities of special nuclear materials from China, most
experts now believe Iran could get a bomb within 3 to 5 years, while
some analysts fear it could do so in 24 months or less. Given the
size of Iran’s nuclear power-related facilities, completion of its first
weapon, moreover, could quickly be followed by the production of
scores of weapons. Iran’s neighbors―nations that are all historically
allied with the United States, including Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and Egypt―are unlikely to welcome Iran coming so close
to acquiring nuclear weapons. The adverse responses they might
take include seeking new security ties, acquiring their own nuclear
weapons options and relying less on the United States to assure their
security.
All of these possibilities highlight America’s need to act
decisively with its closest friends to dissuade Iran from continuing
on its current path and to make sure that no nation emulates Iran’s
nuclear example. The question is how.
Currently, there are three fashionable proposals to curb Iran’s
nuclear program, each of which is too uncertain or too self-defeating
to effectively address the nuclear threat.
•

Bomb Iran’s Known Nuclear Sites. Iranians fear this. Exercising
this option, though, is risky. A “surgical” strike could start a war
(Iranian counterstrikes against U.S. forces in Iraq or terrorist
strikes elsewhere against the United States and Israel, etc.). Even
with the best planning, such a strike would be unlikely to destroy
all of Iran’s covert weapons efforts or stop its weapons scientists
from resuming work. To maximize surprise, the United States
(or Israel) would want to attack before securing other nations’
support. This, however, could jeopardize international backing
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to contain Iran afterwards and would likely raise serious doubts
about the utility of the NPT and the IAEA―norms that might
otherwise help justify such a raid.
•

Change the Regime. The United States and its allies say they
want to promote human rights and pluralistic politics in Iran.
Ultimately, this requires regime change (whether by overthrow or
major reform). How might this advance nuclear nonproliferation
in Iran? Is the regime in Iran likely to change before it acquires
a bomb? Would a new government end the nuclear program (or
surrender any bomb materials it might have produced)? How (if
at all) could promoting such a change stigmatize Iran as an NPT
violator to discourage would be bombmakers from following
suit? The answers to these questions remain unclear.

•

Cut a Deal. Many officials in Europe, Asia, Russia, and China
favor cutting a deal with Tehran. They would like to see the
understanding the United Kingdom, France, and Germany
reached with Iran on October 21, 2003, as the first step toward
a larger deal. The logic of this approach is to give Iran what it
wants―U.S. recognition, lifting of U.S. sanctions, U.S. security
guarantees and, in time, withdrawal of U.S. military forces in the
Gulf and access to advanced technology and Western markets―
for what we want―an end to Iran’s dangerous nuclear activities,
a cut-off of support of terrorist organizations, and adherence
to agreed human rights strictures. But how long would it take
to conclude such a deal? How could one prevent Iran from
stringing the United States and its allies along until it acquired
all it needed to breakout with a nuclear arsenal? Given what Iran
could do covertly and the vast amounts of plutonium its power
reactors would be producing, how likely is any inspection,
including the IAEA’s new l992+3 inspection protocol, to detect
covert enrichment or reprocessing activities early enough to
prevent Iran’s speedy completion of a bomb? Could the current
government, which has already cheated on the NPT, be trusted
to deliver on its promises? How could any deal be cut without
it looking like a reward for Iran skirting the NPT? Would such

7

a deal with the hard-line government undercut pro-American
democratic reformers by suggesting that America’s real interest
is geo-strategic realpolitik rather than support for liberalization?
How could a deal be squared with the Bush administration’s
declaration that past deals with Middle East autocrats fed antiAmericanism and terrorism and that it is now in U.S. strategic
interests to transform the Middle East?
Considering only these options, the outlook for halting Iran’s
program seems grim. Yet, if one views the current nuclear crisis as
part of a larger, long-term, security competition, the United States
and its friends have clear advantages that would allow them to take
approaches different from the those described above. In a year-long
series of NPEC workshops, 30 regional experts, in fact, identified
three enduring weaknesses of the current Iranian regime that could
be exploited:
•

It is enormously unpopular. Recent student demonstrations
and the consequent government crack down (with thousands of
arrests) are indicative of how 70 percent of the population (now
under age 30 with no memory of the l979 revolution) feels. The
government’s fear of popular resistance forces it to fractionate
and repress a variety of government bodies to guard against
significant political reform. It also requires it to maintain an
external threat to sustain domestic control. As a result, Iranian
officials tend to demonize the United States and Israel and obsess
about what Iran’s immediate neighbors might do. This last point
has immediate implications for any negotiated deal over Iran’s
nuclear program. When members of Iran’s Expediency Council
met in Geneva with the co-chairmen of this project, they had
difficulty believing the United States and its allies would reverse
their hostility toward Iran if Iran cut off its ties to terrorist
organizations, promoted human rights, and terminated its
nuclear program. Instead, they wanted the United States to agree
to a list of demands before Iran acted.

•

It is strategically lonely. Iran lacks friends and does not work
well with others. Despite its most recent agreement to suspend
8

its uranium enrichment activities (for how long, is still unclear),
it still is at odds with the European Union (EU) over human
rights; the IAEA for dodging agency resolutions that it come
totally clean on its nuclear past; and the United States and
most of the world for harboring and supporting terrorists―now
including Al Qaeda agents―who are all too willing to use any
means (including chemical, biological, or nuclear devices) to
attack Israel, Europe, and the United States. Given its loneliness,
Tehran is particularly anxious to avoid being brought before
the UN. Meanwhile, locally, Iran is suspicious of nearly all of
its neighbors and is still quite frightened of being attacked or
subverted by the United States or Israel. This, in turn, encourages
it to turn inward. The end result is that the country that Iran
now has the closest military cooperation with―North Korea―is
itself on the outs. As for its closest diplomatic allies―Russia and
China―these states’ help is triggered less by Iran’s needs than a
desire to oppose the United States.
•

It is desperate for Western help. The flip-side of Iran’s strategic
loneliness is its overweening sense of self-importance. Iranian
officials believe that Iran should be the most powerful and
richest state in the region and cannot understand why it is not.
Meanwhile, Iran’s high level of corruption and state interference
in the economy has wrecked the economy and produced a
domestic unemployment rate of over 25 percent: To deal with
this, Iran must let over 200,000 of its young people emigrate
annually to the West to find work. As Iranian officials see it, the
only way to reverse these trends is to get full access to advanced
Western technology, Western financial assets, and America’s
enormous export market.

What is interesting about these weaknesses is how they feed one
another: The more strategically lonely Iran gets, the more desperate
it is for Western help; the more unpopular its government becomes,
the more it blames outside forces for its shortcomings. This, in turn,
only makes it more strategically isolated. There was considerable
debate among the workshop participants about how long the current

9

regime might last and what it would take to bring it down―some
thinking it was fragile, most thinking that it would go on for many
years. But, in the end, all thought Iran would eventually give way to
some more moderate form of rule.
Given the uncertainly regarding the revolutionary government’s
longevity, the question arises as to how the United States and its
friends should proceed against Iran’s nuclear program, which is
progressing at a rapid rate. If the objective is to try to terminate the
program immediately, the shortcomings of the three most popular
options already noted come into play. If, on the other hand, the
objective is to keep Iran from making or deploying nuclear weapons
and to make sure Iran does not become a model for other would
be bombmakers to follow, then the United States and its friends
can exploit the Revolutionary government’s enduring weaknesses.
With proper care, the United States and its allies could even see
Iran’s current government give way to a less hostile regime. These
long-term aims were the ones the working group believed were the
ones most worthy of U.S. and allied effort and would require timely
application of one or more of America’s and its allies’ strengths.
These include:
•

Power to lead and maintain military alliances. In the last
16 years, the United States has operated alone or in concert
effectively against Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly,
after toppling Saddam and the Taliban, the United States and its
friends have made it clear that they will be backing Iraq’s and
Afghanistan’s security, and in all probability operating out of
Iraq and Afghanistan for the next decade or more. In addition, the
United States has friendly military relations with the U.K., Spain,
Poland, Japan, most of the EU, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Kuwait,
Turkey, Jordan, and most of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It also
has close ties with several nations that have extensive experience
operating covertly against a variety of Middle Eastern nations.

•

Ability to apply economic leverage. The United States, the EU,
and Japan have all been on record as opposing Iran’s nuclear
weapons activities. All have backed the IAEA’s efforts to get Iran
to come clean on its previously undeclared nuclear activities.
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Japan has held back from investing billions for oil development
in Iran. The EU, meanwhile, has put off extending a major trade
protocol with Iran until and unless it makes its nuclear program
more transparent, improves its human rights record, and ends
its ties with terrorist organizations. Germany, France, and Great
Britain indicated in their October 21 understanding that Iran
“could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies
in a wide range of areas,” but only if it suspends its enrichment
and processing activities and is able to convince the IAEA that its
nuclear activities are entirely peaceful. Also, the United States,
which constitutes Iran’s largest potential export market, could
expand trade with Tehran significantly, if it chose to do so. To
date, Washington has cut off private U.S. investment in Iran
and has frozen Iranian overseas assets which Iran erroneously
believes amount to billions of dollars.
•

Attractive alternative political and social culture. The United
States and Europe are culturally attractive to a majority of
Iranian citizens. Many have visited and studied in the West and
continue to do so. More have listened to or seen Western popular
music, television, or movies. Western democracy is also seen
as an attractive political alternative. The current government
encourages some expressions of popular will and is quite
sensitive about its lack of popularity for this reason. Recently,
the government actually paid Cuba to jam alternative Iranian
broadcasting from Los Angeles for fear of its seditious influence.
Precisely because the government paints the United States as the
Great Satan, embracing aspects of U.S. and Western culture is
seen by Iranians as a way to resist.

Competitive Strategies.
Keeping these strengths in mind, participants in NPEC’s
workshops suggested that the United States and its friends approach
curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions as part of a larger, more general
competition whose aims would include:
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•

demonstrating U.S. and allied support for the welfare of common
Iranians. This effort should be geared to help undermine the
Revolutionary government’s efforts to portray the United
States and its friends as security threats that warrant repressive
domestic rule;

•

making it clear to Iran and its neighbors (i.e., Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Syria, and Turkey) that following Iran’s nuclear example
or violating the NPT is a poor way to hedge their own security
bets, and that NPT and IAEA requirements are firm and will be
in enforced.

•

showing America’s allies who believe a quick deal with Iran is
possible and desirable that any sound understanding―one with
clear, worthwhile goals, and deadlines―is something that the
current regime is incapable of delivering on until and unless the
government undergoes major change.

•

alerting Iran that any further progress on its “civilian” nuclear
power program risks isolating it further and increasing the
military risks it otherwise would not have to run.

•

creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that above measures are
actually implemented.

To achieve these larger goals, the group concluded that the
United States and its friends should pursue a series at least three
separate but related competitive strategies. These strategies’
ultimate aim would be to deter and delay Iran and its neighbors from
developing or deploying nuclear weapons, keep America’s allies
united in opposing the current regime’s most threatening activities,
and increase pressures on the current regime either to change or to
give way to a less hostile one that would be less wedded to having
nuclear weapons:
1. Challenge Iran’s NPT noncompliance as being decisive to the
future of nuclear nonproliferation. The United States has done well
to get the IAEA Board of Governors (including Russia) to demand that
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Iran freeze its enrichment and possible reprocessing facilities, allow
more intrusive inspections, and clarify its past nuclear activities.
Firmness on these points prompted Iran to agree to accede to these
demands in an understanding reached with Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom on October 21, 2003. Senior Iranian officials
made it very clear that under no circumstances could their country
succeed if the matter of their nuclear activities were characterized as
being illegal and were referred to the UN for action. An immediate
danger now that Tehran has said it would comply with the IAEA’s
September 12 demands, however, is that the United States or its
allies might settle for only partial delivery on Iran’s pledges. Given
growing evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons option,
such weakness would not only give Iran a pass to pursue its nuclear
ambitions, but encourage other nuclear weapons aspirants (starting
with Iran’s neighbors) to follow in Tehran’s footsteps. This later
prospect is at least as worrisome as the first. It will likely take the
IAEA some months to make sense of the Iranian documents and
nuclear equipment it is now examining in its effort to determine
Iran’s NPT compliance status. During this period, the IAEA should
call for a temporary suspension of all nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Ultimately, however, the IAEA will have little choice but to find Iran
either to be in violation or not clearly in full compliance and this, in
turn, should prompt sanctions. Indeed, doing anything less would
seriously jeopardize the IAEA’s credibility and that of the NPT. The
reasons why already are plain:
•

Iran has already admitted to violating its safeguards agreement
with the IAEA by not properly alerting the IAEA about its
importation of uranium and conversion of uranium into metal.

•

The IAEA’s own statute stipulates that the agency must report all
safeguards violations to the UNSC. As such, not to report would
be to have the IAEA punt on its own procedures and suggest that
the IAEA can be duped or bullied.

•

Although the IAEA set October 31, 2003 as the deadline for Iran
to explain the trace amounts of HEU the IAEA found, Iranian
officials claim that they will never be able to fully resolve this
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mystery except to claim that the centrifuge equipment they
imported was “contaminated” and that the brokers that sold this
equipment can’t say where they bought this equipment from.
•

HEU is directly usable to make kiloton-yield weapons.

•

There is good reason to believe that this equipment came by way
of Pakistan’s or Russia’s nuclear weapons program (which goes
to Iran’s intent to build weapons in violation of Article II of the
NPT, a key provision that prohibits non-weapons state members
from seeking or receiving “any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons”). On this last point, Iranian officials insist that
the burden of proof that it is in violation is on the IAEA. Yet,
just the reverse is the case: Once a state is found in possession
of undeclared special nuclear materials, the burden is on it to
explain how it could possess such material without being found
in violation of the NPT.

•

If Iran did enrich uranium to make HEU, it would have violated
its IAEA safeguards agreement since it would have failed to
notify the IAEA of the introduction of special nuclear material
into an undeclared enrichment facility.

•

If the IAEA fails to report these points to the UNSC as the IAEA’s
charter requires, it will appear weak and only encourage more
Iranian welshing (e.g., Iranian officials’ recent announcement
that it is “studying” how it could possibly suspend its enrichment
activity).

•

Finally, unless an IAEA violations finding is in prospect (or its
functional equivalent―i.e., an IAEA finding that it cannot find
Iran to be in full compliance), any state could simply follow
Iran’s example and violate the NPT or IAEA in the expectation
that the IAEA would give them a similar pass.

In addition to these points, members of the IAEA’s board of
governors should reflect on IAEA director general el Baradei’s
own recent public warnings that were prominently featured in the
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October 18, 2003, edition of The Economist. In a detailed column that
he authored, the director general spoke out about the limitations of
IAEA inspections. There is no monitoring effort, he explained, not
even the additional protocol the IAEA is asking Iran to implement,
that can prevent nations from acquiring nuclear weapons so long
as they are allowed to have enrichment, reprocessing, and power
reactor programs. NPEC-commissioned research corroborates these
points. If Iran uses natural uranium, it could make its first bomb in
36 months or less. In the case of using light water reactor fresh fuel
as enrichment feed, the time lines would be much shorter―under
selected scenarios, a matter of days or weeks. Once Iran’s light
water power reactor is up and running, the time lines for it making
plutonium for bombs are also short. The Russians announced in
the fall of 2003 that they intend to slip the completion date of the
reactor another 2 years. It remains to be seen if the Russians stick
to this schedule. Russia has also proposed to take back any spent
fuel generated from Bushehr. In any case, 12-15 months after the
reactor goes into operation, it will contain roughly 60 bombs’ worth
of near weapons-grade plutonium. With only modest investment,
Iran could easily build a reprocessing plant covertly at any time in
4 to 6 months in a space 30 feet by 40 feet by 130 feet, using readily
accessible technology. With such a facility on the ready, Iran could
run the reactor and then tell inspectors and Russians that it wants
to examine the spent fuel. This might cause alarm (or not); it would
hardly matter. In as little as a week, well before anyone could agree
on the facts, much less a clear course of action, Iran could make a
bomb’s worth of plutonium metal a day.
It is for this reason and because of Iran’s past cheating (and
its contradictory explanations about the trace quantities of HEU
inspectors found), that the IAEA should report to the UNSC even
before it completes its analysis of Iranian documents and equipment
associated with the agency’s discovery of trace quantities of HEU. In
this “interim” report, the IAEA should:
•

call on all nations to suspend temporarily any further nuclear
cooperation with Iran until the IAEA can clarify this matter and
establish whether or not Iran has come into full compliance with
the NPT;
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•

insist that Iran uphold the freeze on its uranium enrichment
and processing activities that it agreed to October 21, 2003 with
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom;

•

establish a reasonable schedule for clarifying the origin of the
trace amounts of bomb usable highly enriched uranium (HEU)
the IAEA has found.

•

ask the permanent five members of the UNSC (P-5) to agree to
how they would act upon receipt of an IAEA report that found a
member not to be clearly in full compliance with either its IAEA
safeguards agreement or the NPT.

The filing of this report would be immediately beneficial. At the
very least, it would help provide the justification the Russians need to
keep from completing Bushehr. This is important. Without Bushehr,
Iran lacks any “peaceful” justification for mining, enriching, or
reprocessing nuclear materials for power production. Also, without
this reactor, Iran would be deprived of the lightly enriched uranium
fuel required to complete the two quickest routes to generating a
large number of nuclear weapons―weapons usable plutonium from
Bushehr’s spent fuel or weapons uranium derived from the lightly
enriched uranium it could feed into its centrifuge program.
It also could help set a major revitalization of the NPT into
motion by getting the P-5 focused on enforcing the NPT. Such an
effort is urgently needed since the UNSC has still taken no action on
the IAEA’s violation report it filed in February 2003 regarding North
Korea.
Among the NPT enforcement actions the P-5 ought to consider
and adopt are:
•

calling on all nations to cooperate in interdicting all nuclear
related exports and imports to and from the identified violator
until that nation comes back into full compliance with the NPT;

•

banning any further peaceful nuclear cooperation with any state
the IAEA has determined is not clearly in full compliance with
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its NPT obligations until such time as the agency validates full
adherence;
•

insisting that all of the provisions of the NPT continue to apply to
states even if they then attempt to withdraw from the NPT until
and unless they dismantle or surrender the nuclear goods they
have acquired under the NPT;

•

authorizing increasingly stiff economic sanctions against states
the IAEA identifies as no longer clearly being in full compliance
with their NPT obligations starting with the suspension of
international financial institutional investments so long as the
noncompliant state fails to resolve its violations; and,

•

creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that the above measures
are actually implemented.

This effort, like the IAEA’s own review of the evidence regarding
Iran, would likely take several months. During this period, though,
there would be a presumption against any state taking any step to
violate or undermine the NPT. Beyond this, it also would increase
U.S. and allied leverage to get Iran to reconsider its nuclear program,
and increase international support for isolating Iran if it continues to
develop nuclear weapons-related capabilities.
2. Encourage Iranians to debate the merits of their nuclear power
program and support of terrorism. As has already been noted, Iran
could possibly have its first uranium bomb in as little as 2 years. It
will take some months, at best, to get the IAEA and the UN Security
Council to determine Iran’s compliance status and to impose sanctions
as appropriate. Whatever the outcome of these international efforts,
though, the United States and its allies need separately to explain
what Iranians can expect from a U.S.-led coalition if Iran continues
its nuclear power program (which effectively assures Iran a nuclear
weapons option) and retains its ties to terrorist organizations. At the
same time, the United States and its key allies should also explain
what benefits Iranians can expect―improved relations with the West
that include a lifting of sanctions, major power security guarantees,
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energy aid, enhanced trade relations with Europe, and formal
diplomatic relations with the United States―if they drop their ties to
terrorists and end their nuclear power activities.
A key requirement for receiving any benefits would be for
Iran to dismantle its nuclear power-related facilities in a verifiable
way. The dismantling of these facilities would have to commence
before these facilities could ever produce their first bomb’s worth of
uranium or plutonium, i.e., before the end of 2005. If Iran did this,
the United States and its key Western allies should ease work visa
regulations to help absorb the many Iranian nuclear technicians that
would otherwise be without work. Iran would also have to cut ties to
terrorist organizations. Here the potential nexus between terrorism
and nuclear weapons figures largely. Certainly, if Iran comes within
weeks of being able to have a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, it will
only feel more confident in sheltering and supporting terrorists, the
harboring of which would otherwise make Iran a potential military
target. There also is the prospect that Iran might actually share its
nuclear knowledge with these organizations. In this case, Iran could
use these groups as strategic proxies to pose the very nuclear threats―
against the United States, Iran’s neighbors, and Israel―that Iran’s
own acquisition of a weapons option would otherwise accomplish.
Also, as long as Iran keeps its ties to these terrorist organizations, it
can always arm them with chemical or biological agents and other
explosives, even if it abandons its nuclear power-related activities.
With these arms, terrorists could accomplish many of the same goals
that the United States and its allies fear these organizations might
with nuclear weapons. Getting Iran to cut its terrorist ties, as such,
is no less critical than getting it to end its nuclear weapons relevant
activities.
Who should take the lead in explaining these points to Iran―
Washington, the EU, Russia, or the P-5―and how these points would
be presented, would have to be worked out.
As a compliment to this effort and to increase the credibility
of the benefits Iranians could expect if they did drop their nuclear
power program and terrorist support, the United States should
launch a long-term outreach effort to the Iranian people (particularly
those unhappy with the current style and substance of the current
government’s rule). The aim here would be to undermine the
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Revolutionary government’s demonization of the United States,
which it uses to help justify its hostile, repressive policies. Achieving
this objective will require persistent effort and should start with one
or more of the following modest steps:
•

Ease current travel restrictions on friendly Iranians visiting
the United States. Under post-9/11 restrictions, Iranian
dissidents and goodwill sports teams visiting the United
States must be fingerprinted and photographed. In 2001, the
Bush Administration allowed a wrestling team to enter the
United States without fingerprinting. This was duly noted
and appreciated. A way to make this outcome more likely and
predictable is needed for desirable Iranian visitors. In addition,
the United States should sponsor visits to the United States from
Iranian journalists, prominent Iranian women, and Shia clergy.

•

Provide logistical support for the direct broadcast of dissidents’
messages into Iran. Given the recent Cuban jamming of
broadcasts from Los Angeles, the U.S. Government should make
available alternative secure means for these groups to reach their
audiences. And it should provide material for use by private
broadcasters and extend and expand the Voice of America
television broadcasts in Persian, which have had difficulty
securing stable funding.

•

Make free instruction opportunities available over the internet.
The Iranian government has had difficulty controlling the
public’s use of the internet to access Western sites and to
communicate internationally. The United States and its friends
should exploit this by offering the Iranian public a wide variety
of internet educational courses tailored to their needs and desire
for self-improvement. These internet courses should be offered
free of cost from accredited recognized educational institutions
and should lead to degrees to the extent possible.

•

Expand disaster relief as required. This would not require a
change in U.S. policy, only a more active effort to implement and
properly publicize it.
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•

Provide counternarcotic assistance. The United States already
is trying to stem the flow of Afghani drugs (the key source of
Iranian drug users). It should augment these efforts and publicize
what it has accomplished there. The UN Office for Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) has an office in Tehran and is working to help
reduce drug sales and use in Iran. Section 307 of the U.S. Foreign
Assistance Act, however, prevents Iran from benefiting from U.S.
contributions to international organizations. This prohibition has
been waived for Iran in the cases of the IAEA and UNICEF. The
President has not yet waived it for UNODC, though. This should
be reviewed.

•

Public health and health care assistance. Over 20,000 Iranians
have contracted HIV/AIDs, mostly as a result of narcotics
use. To address this growing problem, the United States could
facilitate public health professionals’ travel to Iran to assist in
current World Health Organization (WHO) efforts to control this
virus in Iran. More generally, the United States could expand its
public health professional exchanges with Iran and work with
local hospitals and doctors to establish the kind of computerbased public health monitoring systems currently being installed
at very low costs in the United States and in NATO nations.

These efforts, which serve a number of political purposes
(including reaching out to the possible future leaders of Iran) should
be continued even if they fail to get the current government to
reconsider its nuclear power program and support of terrorism. That
said, if the rulers in Tehran fail to have a change of heart on these
issues, the United States and its friends must be prepared for a much
longer competition to turn Iran around. This longer competition
would necessarily involve shoring up U.S. and allied security
relations with Iran’s neighbors (to limit the harm to regional and
international security that Iranian nuclear threats might otherwise
pose) and undermining Iran’s confidence in the wisdom of its
current policies.
3. If Iran continues to pursue worrisome nuclear activities,
ramp up U.S. and allied military regional capabilities both to
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neutralize the Iranian threat and forestall further proliferation.
The United States and the military coalition in Iraq already must
guarantee Iraq’s security. Many of these same countries are also
cooperating in efforts under the Proliferation Security Initiative to
interdict nuclear weapons-related goods from reaching or leaving
countries like Iran. Beyond this, the coalition needs to consult
with the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel,
and Egypt about their military plans for coping with a militant,
nuclear (or near-nuclear) Iran. Certainly, Iran must understand that
if it persists in developing its nuclear weapons option, it will face
security costs and risks that would outweigh the possible value of
acquiring nuclear weapons. At a minimum, plans should be made
now on how additional military cooperation with Iran’s neighbors
(including intelligence sharing, missile defense cooperation, joint
training, base sharing agreements, etc.) might best counter the threat
and what new security arrangements, if any, would be appropriate.
The general aim of these efforts should be to give Iran a choice
between being outside of these arrangements (and a key reason for
their establishment) or becoming an equal member by dropping
its terrorist ties and becoming nonnuclear. Detailing what kind of
security cooperation is desirable and clarifying the merits of overt
and covert military action will be the focus of NPEC’s follow-on
analysis to be completed next spring.
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CHAPTER 2
IRAN’S “LEGAL” PATHS TO THE BOMB
Victor Gilinsky
Introduction and Summary.
Recent events have reinforced the persistent suspicion that Iran
seeks nuclear weapons. That suspicion is fed by Iran’s drive to obtain
all aspects of nuclear power technology, whether economically
justified or not. Iran’s strong emphasis on those technologies that
would permit production of nuclear explosives―plutonium and
highly enriched uranium―is especially worrisome. So is Iran’s
resistance to accepting more effective international inspections
and, even more so, its likely violation of its current reporting
obligations.
Iran’s rationale for pursuing these technologies is that they would
support the operation of its nuclear power reactors for generating
electricity. So far, Iran has only one Russian-supplied unit, Bushehr
1, under construction. But it looks more and more as if the country―
that is to say, the directorate of the nuclear program―has more in
mind than generating electricity. Consider, for example, the issue
of plutonium. The Bushehr reactor, like any uranium-fueled power
reactor, would produce militarily-significant amounts of plutonium
in its fuel during operation. Under U.S. pressure to make sure the
plutonium from Bushehr did not end up in bombs, the Russians have
agreed to take back the reactor’s radioactive spent fuel, 1 percent of
which would produce plutonium during the reactor’s operation.
Most power reactor operators are delighted to get rid of their spent
fuel. The contained plutonium has no economic value. Iran, however,
has made it clear that it intends to pursue reprocessing technology
to separate the plutonium from spent fuel, which raises questions
about the future of that Bushehr product.
As was revealed in August 2002 by an opposition group, Iran is
also building a heavy water plant at Arak.1 Iran has since informed
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the IAEA it intends to build a heavy water reactor, which would be
even more suited to producing plutonium.
Iran is also opening the door to producing the other nuclear
explosive of interest―highly enriched uranium.2 Bushehr, like all
water-cooled power reactors, would use low enriched uranium as
fuel that Russia would normally supply. Yet in August 2002 it was
brought to light by the same Iranian dissidents that Iran was building
uranium centrifuge enrichment plants.3 These cannot remotely be
justified economically on the basis of Iran’s nuclear power program.
They would, however, be of major importance for producing nuclear
weapons. The secretiveness about these plants during their early
development is unsettling. Even more unsettling is the likelihood
that Iran violated its safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in testing its pilot enrichment plant.
Likely IAEA Reporting Violations.
Iran, as a consequence of its adherence to the Nonproliferation
Treaty, was obligated to inform the IAEA if it tested its centrifuges
with uranium hexafluoride gas. It did not so inform the IAEA. It now
asserts it used other gases for testing. It is, however, very difficult
to believe Iran’s assertion that it built its pilot centrifuge cascade
and launched a huge centrifuge complex construction project
without testing its unit design with the real stuff, so to speak. Such
an omission would have violated all normal engineering practice.
Moreover, Iran has resisted IAEA efforts to take environmental
samples at the facility to check on Iran’s claim.4 Iran insists that it
is not obligated to permit such sampling since it has not signed the
Additional Protocol requested by the Agency of all its members.
There are a number of other IAEA reporting failures and activities
that have raised concern:5
•

In 1991, Iran imported 1.8 tons of natural uranium and failed
to report it to the IAEA. Iran said it was not legally required
to report it. The IAEA said Iran must declare all such imports
“as soon as possible.”
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•

Iran informed the IAEA in May that it intended to build a
heavy-water research reactor at Arak, the existence of which
the IAEA learned about in 2002 from media reports. This
plant would yield weapons-grade plutonium.

•

Iran has converted natural uranium into uranium metal. The
IAEA says “the role of uranium metal . . . needs to be fully
understood, since neither (Iran’s) light water reactors nor its
planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal.”

Resisting the IAEA Additional Protocol.6
Adding to long-term suspicions is that Iran has been also
unwilling to accept advanced IAEA safeguards―the so-called
Additional Protocol that most countries have signed―that would
permit more extensive inspection by the Agency.
The Additional Protocol (based on INFCIRC/540 [corr.]) is,
according to the IAEA, the key to its strengthened safeguards
system. Signers agree to provide the IAEA with broader information
covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities,
including research and development and uranium mining. They
must also grant the Agency broader access rights, including short
notice inspections of all building at nuclear sites. They must also
allow the IAEA to use advanced verification technologies, including
environmental sampling.
The new Protocol would also allow the Agency to obtain more
and earlier design information. The current requirement is that the
IAEA is to obtain such information “as early as possible” without
specifying a definite time.7
Iran recently said it would accept such a protocol if the United
States and other countries would relax current restrictions on nuclear
technology exports to Iran.8 The United States would not agree for
obvious and sensible reasons.
Is the Civilian Program Only a “Cover”?
There is still a tendency, even among those convinced Iran is
intent on getting nuclear weapons, to see the country’s nuclear power
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program as a cover for a separate clandestine weapons program
rather than part of a weapon program and to fail to appreciate the
nuclear explosive production capacity of the “civilian” program
itself, especially that of the Russian-supplied Bushehr power reactor
nearing completion. 9 Weapon design and preparation for weapon
fabrication would, of course, have to be under cover, at least so long
as Iran remains a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Clandestine nuclear explosive production activities may take place,
too. Still, it is not generally appreciated just how close Iran’s planned
nuclear program brings that country to a bomb. And not only would
these activities―entirely legal under the current interpretation of the
NPT so long as the IAEA can inspect them―bring Iran to the threshold
of a bomb, but to the capacity for producing large numbers of them.10
This report will provide estimates of the formidable potential of the
reactor and related fuel cycle facilities.
Brief Background to Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran was one of the first signers of the NPT. From the first,
however, Iran exemplified the hypocrisies embedded in the Treaty.
The Treaty started as an effort among non-nuclear states to stem the
spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. In its final form it became a
deal between the haves and have-nots―the have-nots would promise
to forego nuclear weapons and allow the IAEA to inspect their
nuclear facilities (a promise reversible on 90 days’ notice) in return
for full access to all peaceful applications of nuclear technology just
short of bombmaking. The Shah ratified the NPT in 1970 and soon
after that started planning a grandiose nuclear power program that
at one point included 23 nuclear power plants. It appears though
that the Shah had more in mind than generating electricity and that
he also started a secret nuclear weapons research program at about
the same time.
All this came to a halt with the 1979 Islamic revolution and
the Shah’s departure. The new rulers apparently revived nuclear
activities in the mid-1980s, when reports once again reached the
West of bomb-related interests on the part of Iran. Unlike Iraq, which
tried (and failed) to produce nuclear explosives by means of a secret
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nuclear weapons project outside of the “declared” sector subject to
IAEA inspections, Iran has skillfully exploited the weakness of the
NPT. There is nothing illegal from the point of view of the Treaty, for
example, in separating plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel, or in
producing enriched uranium, so long as the facilities are accessible
to IAEA inspectors. Since obtaining the nuclear explosive material is
the most difficult part of making a bomb, this permissiveness allows
a would-be bombmaker to get very close to his goal. And since an
illicit bomb design and manufacturing capability is relatively easy
to hide―it does not involve nuclear materials―it can be prepared
secretly in parallel with overt explosive material production, so that
when the material is ready it can almost immediately be put to bomb
use.
That is the assumption the IAEA uses, at least in principle, for
the purpose of guiding the timing of its own inspections. Article 28
of the current IAEA-Iran agreement states the “timely detection”
principle:
The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of
the Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such
diversion by the risk of early detection.11

The IAEA estimates that once in possession of the explosive
material, a country that is so inclined and has made the necessary
preparation in design and manufacturing capability can produce
bombs in a week or two.12 Interestingly, the IAEA then sets a goal
for inspection frequency for holders of such materials at a month,
and even that goal is not met consistently. Obviously, the Agency
has given up the ability to provide “early warning” of an attempt
to make one or a small number of bombs, and has relied on the
deterrence effect of its ability to detect a larger bomb manufacturing
effort within a month or so of the start of bomb manufacture. The
effectiveness of a deterrent based on such a delayed unmasking of a
would-be bombmaker is very much open to question.
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Plutonium: Iran’s Light Water Reactor at Bushehr.
The light water reactor that Russia is building for Iran, and of
which Iran would like to get additional units, is a copious source of
plutonium. This plutonium would not be difficult for Iran to extract.
Too much has been made of the difficulty of reprocessing light water
reactor (LWR) fuel, especially by a country with Iran’s industrial
base.13
The Bushehr nuclear power station based on the Russian LWR,
with an electric generating capacity of 1,000 megawatts, is apparently
nearing completion and the builders say it will be ready for fueling
and testing within a year. Once it starts commercial operation it
could produce―like any reactor of its type―about 250 kilograms of
plutonium a year in the reactor’s fuel. The significance of such an
amount is obvious when one considers that the amount needed for a
bomb is several kilograms.
To avoid accusations that they are helping the Iranians produce
bombs, the Russians have said they have arranged to take back the
reactor’s spent fuel. In fact, they say they will pay Iran to get it back,
which is a very unusual arrangement considered from a commercial

Figure 1. Bushehr Light Water Reacter.
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point of view. Usually, operators of nuclear plants welcome any
opportunity to ship it elsewhere. The fact that the Russians had to
agree to pay for the spent fuel suggests the Iranians were not eager
to get rid of it. The Iranians apparently forced the Russians to pay
blackmail in order to revise their contract to one that would protect
them against charges of contributing to weapons capabilities in
Iran, which raises concerns all by itself. In any case, it is uncertain
how such a spent fuel repatriation scheme would work and how
effective it would be in the event the Iranians decided they wanted
to stop shipping fuel to Russia. The arrangement has been thrown
further into question by Iran’s statement that it intends to acquire the
capability to reprocess LWR fuel to extract plutonium, a capability
it would not need to operate the nuclear units economically, and
would have no use for if the spent fuel is to return to Russia.14
Despite the obvious plutonium production potential of the
Bushehr reactor, the conventional concern about how Iran might
obtain nuclear weapons has not centered on that plant. It has been
that it might conduct a clandestine nuclear weapon program in the
“shadow” of its civilian nuclear electric power program. For example,
a Washington think-tank report on Iran, written in 2000, says the
following under the heading of “Reactors and Proliferation”:
It not clear that Iran’s reactor purchases are meant to be an
integrated part of Iran’s nuclear weapons effort, as distinguished
from a way of acquiring the necessary nuclear technology. The
reactor design Russia is selling Iran produces only very limited
amounts of plutonium, and no country has as yet used a similar
reactor design to acquire fissile material.15

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) congressional testimony at about
the same time conveys pretty much the same message:
Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear
power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This project will not
directly support a weapons effort, but it affords Iran broad access
to Russia’s nuclear industry.16

Plutonium from Bushehr (in fact, from all LWRs) is more
significant for weapons use than generally appreciated. A recent
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Livermore report calculates that such a reactor can produce about
300 kilograms (about 50 bombs’ worth) of near-weapon-grade
plutonium produced by the first refueling―about 15 months after
startup.17 As mentioned earlier, the difficulty of extracting such
plutonium from the radioactive spent fuel in which it is embedded
has also been exaggerated. As put in an earlier 1995 Livermore
report, the plutonium “can be separated from spent fuel with modest
facilities and equipment.” 18
The utility of bombs made from such near-weapons grade
plutonium (“first cycle plutonium,” from LWR spent fuel removed
after one normal operation cycle) does not differ much from that of
so-called weapons grade plutonium. The difference comes from the
higher content of the plutonium-240 isotope (14 percent in the firstcycle plutonium as opposed to about 6-7 percent in weapons grade).
The plutonium-240 fissions spontaneously, thus releasing neutrons
to start a premature chain reaction in the fissile plutonium-239 as
it is compressed in a detonating warhead. The random plutonium240 spontaneous fissions introduce an uncertainty in yield because
the premature chain reactions do not produce the maximum yield.
The same problem affects the weapons grade material, only to a
lesser extent, at least at the relatively basic weapons design level we
assume here.19 (The problem more or less goes away in advanced
weapon designs.) Calculations on the performance of near-weapons
grade plutonium performed for NPEC show that―using technology
not much beyond that of the first U.S. weapons―the probability is
high of attaining yields above the low kilotons with this material.
The mean yield would be about 10 kilotons and the probability of
exceeding a yield of about 20 kilotons would be about one-third,
more or less the yield of the bombs dropped on Japan. 20
The previously cited 1995 Livermore report stated more
generally that “reactor-grade (RG) plutonium, such as that produced
in commercial power reactors (after three fuel cycles rather than one
as assumed above and thus of lower utility), can be used to construct
a nuclear weapon with a yield of “at least a kiloton.” The results cited
here for the first-cycle plutonium describe performance considerably
better than this.
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Figure 2. Enrichment Plant Construction.
Uranium Enrichment.
Iran is also developing uranium enrichment technology. It has
pilot centrifuge facilities and has plans for building fairly large
plants. Iran’s claim is that it is interested in uranium enrichment
for the production of LWR fuel. The centrifuges in the enrichment
plants could also easily be reconfigured to produce highly enriched
uranium.
It came as a surprise to the IAEA, and apparently to intelligence
agencies as well, that Iran has a substantial uranium enrichment
program. It took dissident groups within Iran to directed intelligence
to a pilot plant at Natanz. The IAEA visited this plant and found a
pilot facility using a cascade of more than 100 centrifuges. The
IAEA officials reported seeing components for about another 1000
centrifuges. There are now public photographs available of a larger
facility being built partially underground with two meter thick walls.
It isn’t clear whether the technology was an indigenous adaptation,
or whether another country supplied it. An obvious candidate is
Pakistan.
Weapons Significance of the Enrichment Facilities Iran is Building
and Planning.21
To get an idea of the scale of Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity
and its significance in terms of weapons, it is useful to consider
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the enrichment capacity that is needed to support the refueling of
a single large power reactor of the type the Russians are building
at Bushehr. This requires a technical digression on the subject of
enrichment as it applies here. Readers uninterested in the technical
details can skim to the result without loss.
The core of a typical 1000 megawatt LWR such as the Bushehr
reactor contains about 75 tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, a
third of which is replaced at each refueling, about every 18 months.
That means the requirement for fresh LEU fuel amounts to about
17 tons per year. Such LWR fuel is typically enriched to about 34.5 percent in uranium 235. (Recall that natural uranium contains
about 0.7 percent uranium-235, the rest being uranium-238.) For the
purpose of this calculation let us assume the fuel enrichment is 3.6
percent uranium-235.
Enrichment capacity is expressed in units of “separative work
units” (SWU)–kilograms per year, or sometimes in tons SW per
year. (These kilograms and tons are not amounts of material―
unfortunately a somewhat confusing point.)
To produce 17 tons of 3.6 percent LEU fuel requires about 75 tons
of separative work per year.22 The separative work requirement is
not precise because it depends on how the enrichment plant is run.
This result assumes that the plant feed is natural uranium at 0.7
percent uranium-235 and that the “tails assay,” the enrichment of the
rejected material, is at 0.3 percent uranium-235. By raising the tails
assay, by “skimming the cream” of a larger amount of feed material,
one can reduce the amount of separative work required.
The total enrichment capacity of the plant is the sum of the
individual enrichment capacities of the components―in this case,
centrifuges. If we assume a nominal individual centrifuge capacity
of 5 kilograms of separative work per year (or 5 SWU per year), such
a plant would contain about 15,000 centrifuges. This is roughly in
the range, within a factor of two or three, that the Iranians seem to
be talking about for the large plants that are in the initial stages of
construction.
Now consider how much highly enriched uranium such a plant
could produce if the centrifuge cascade―the grouping of individual
centrifuges―is reconfigured for that purpose. A similar enrichment
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calculation, assuming natural uranium feed and a 0.3 percent tails
assay, shows that the same plant reconfigured could produce nearly
400 kg of 90 percent uranium-235, say 20 bombs’ worth, per year.23
Using LEU as Feed Material Reduces Need for Enrichment
Capacity.
Even more interesting is the possibility of using LEU as feed, that
is, starting with uranium already enriched to, say, 3.6 percent rather
than starting with natural uranium. Such low enrichment uranium
could be either material imported for fueling LWRs or material
previously enriched in Iran. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it turns
out that most of the separative work to obtain HEU is already done
in bringing natural uranium to the level of LEU because there is so
much material to deal with at the lower enrichment levels. It turns
out that if one starts with LEU feed, the nearly 400 kilograms of HEU
per year (at about 90 percent uranium-235) could be turned out by
an enrichment plant with a capacity of slightly over 15 tons SW/yr,
or about one-fifth of the capacity needed for starting with natural
uranium feed. This calculation assumes a 1.5 percent tails assay and
therefore 16 tons of LEU feed per year, or about the amount of LEU
needed annually to fuel a reactor of the Bushehr type. With a lower
tails assay the separative work requirement would go up but the
feed requirement would go down, and similarly for the reverse.
The separative work requirements scale with the amount of
product. Starting with LEU, a smaller quantity of HEU, say, 100
kilograms of HEU per year, enough for about five nominal bombs
per year, could be produced by a plant with an enrichment capacity
of less than 4 tons of separative work per year. With the same
assumptions as used previously that would amount to less than
1000 centrifuge units, roughly the level of equipment that the IAEA
inspectors saw on hand in the form of components in a recent visit to
Iran.
Summary: Iran’s Two “Legal” Paths to Nuclear Explosives.
To summarize, the technical possibilities, all “legal” under the
NPT, include both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In terms
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of physical capability, once Bushehr is operational, which is slated for
the end of 2004, Iran would have the possibility of using the Bushehr
reactor plus a reprocessing capability it would have to develop. That
could give it a bomb capability to produce dozens of warheads,
though likely no earlier than, say, 2006. Another possibility, in light
of Iran’s construction of a heavy water plant, would base a military
plutonium production capability on a heavy water reactor, but that
could only come to fruition several years later.
The other, or possibly complementary, course would be based on
highly enriched uranium produced in centrifuge plants, either the
known plants or clandestine ones. A very small facility involving,
say, 1,000 machines of modest capability, that could probably be
hidden effectively, could produce several HEU warheads a year.
If Iran made full use of a larger facility of the sort it appears to be
building, the bomb production capacity would scale accordingly.
Of course, either course would involve treaty violations from
which would follow diplomatic and possibly military consequences.
The violation would not be mitigated by a withdrawal from the
treaty. A country cannot legally gain the fruit of treaty adherence by
accumulating the wherewithal for a bomb and then withdrawing.
(That reflects a standard principle in contracts, but it would be
helpful if the NPT members would say so explicitly.)
Changing the System of Protection in Terms of Allowable
Technology, Inspections, and Enforcement.
Iran illustrates the vulnerabilities of the current international
system of protection against proliferation. A major difficulty is
that the present international norm is too permissive. The NPT has
been read to say that all technologies and materials are acceptable
so long as the owners declare them to be peaceful and allow IAEA
inspection. But we know it is dangerous to allow members to get
arbitrarily close to a bomb, or to have nuclear explosives around that
others could steal. So we have tried to plug the holes in the treaty
with various export controls over what we delicately call “sensitive”
technology. Yet if North Korea had not been so foolish as to cheat,
but instead had let the IAEA watch its pre-1992 reprocessing,
there would not have been grounds for objection, at least under
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the treaty. Iran has taken a more sophisticated approach and is
cleverly exploiting the weaknesses of the NPT. We cannot keep our
fingers in the nuclear dike forever. We need a rule that limits what
is acceptable in terms of civilian nuclear power technology to that
there is a greater safety margin between it and possible military
application. It will likely have to be a common rule applicable to all.
That may sound unrealistic, but the alternative is unsustainable.
The once-through LWR fuel cycle is sometimes called
“proliferation-resistant.” It is a considerable improvement, in terms
of security, over some of the alternatives, but it has its problems, too,
and requires a very tight system of inspection, at least in suspicious
places. At a minimum we need the upgrading in IAEA inspections
that would follow from adoption of the “Additional Protocol” that
most countries have signed and Iran has resisted.
Improved inspection will not be worth much as a deterrent
unless behind it is a credible and effective reaction to violations. It
used to be said years ago that, whatever the deficiencies of IAEA
inspections, if there was ever a serious violation, there would be an
immediate and tough international response. We have discovered
enforcement is a complicated matter and there are always reasons to
hold off. Consider the North Korean affair that has dragged for over
10 years after the IAEA found a serious violation. A chief problem is
that the NPT has no enforcement mechanism so the matter is left to
individual members. We need some kind of permanent international
arrangement.
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uranium 235 has to be over, say, 80 percent. Natural uranium contains only about
0.7 percent uranium 235 and about 99.3 percent uranium 238. The uranium 238
is more or less inert in this context but when irradiated by neutrons, as it would
be sitting in an operating power reactor, it can get turned into plutonium 239, the
other nuclear explosive. Water-cooled power reactors use low enriched uranium
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22. Not to be confused with the mass of the uranium core which happens to
have the same figure.
23. The exact number is 388. The figure is rounded to 400 because the numbers
are all approximate. The bomb equivalent assumes a nominal 20 kg of Uranium235 per warhead.
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CHAPTER 3
IRAN’S INTERNAL STRUGGLES
Geneive Abdo
Overview.
This chapter argues that prospects for fundamental reform,
much less outright revolutionary change, in the Islamic Republic
of Iran are minimal in the short- to medium-term. In the complete
absence today of any coherent, organized opposition and that
of any competing ideology that could effectively challenge the
continued clerical dominance, Iran’s national struggle will remain
for the foreseeable future a matter to be hashed out within the ruling
coalition of “political mullahs” and lay revolutionary activists and
other Islamic intellectuals. It is the members of this elite, known
in contemporary Persian as “insiders,” who together comprise
the two primary political factions, labeled by the Western terms
“reformers” and “hard-liners.” The fate of the Iranian nation has
remained exclusively within this carefully controlled circle since the
consolidation of the Islamic Revolution, and there are no signs that
either wing is prepared to open the door to meaningful participation
by “outsiders” beyond the pale of the revolutionary discourse. As
a result, any clues to the future of Iran must be found among the
behavior, interests and ideology of the “insiders.”
To show why this is the case, I will present a complex,
interrelated set of religious, social and political factors shaping the
nation’s destiny. These include: the essence and dynamics of the
ruling clerical caste, which is deeply divided among “hard-liners,”
“reformers,” and quietist “traditionalists”; the structure of the
Islamic state and the extraordinary concentration of executive and
supervisory powers in the hands of the appointed supreme clerical
leader; the failure of “internal reform” led by President Mohammad
Khatami; and the complete lack of any legitimate or credible
opposition political movement or cohesive ideological challenge to
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the current Islamic political system.
I will analyze both the pillars of Iranian stability that keep the
conservative establishment in power and the institutions and forces
that may come one day to threaten the regime. Throughout, I will
argue that neither revolution nor fundamental reform is likely
anytime soon. The profound reason for this deadlock lies in the
central theological, not political, debate dominating contemporary
Iran: The dream among some to modernize Islam and the ambition of
others to establish a “pure” Islamic state have clashed, destabilizing
the country and undermining the democratic promise of the Islamic
revolution.
The result is a nation frozen in place, one that will remain so
until these deep-set contradictions underpinning the state and its
relationship to society are resolved. Is Iran to be a Shi’ite Muslim
state ruled by clerics with a monopoly on religious truth? Or is it to
be a republic under the will of the people, while remaining consistent
with religious and cultural traditions? While the focus of this paper
is exclusively on Iran, it is worth noting that this broader struggle―a
struggle not of Islam versus the West, but of Islam versus Islam―is
actively at play in postwar Iraq and across the broader Muslim
world.
After detailing the factors listed above and discussing their
implications for regime stability, I will explore some of the potential
turning points that could alter this roadmap and accelerate any
emerging demands for fundamental change. I will also identify some
key events and developments that could alert U.S. policymakers and
other Iran-watchers to possible changes in the religious, social, and
political landscape. These include the upcoming struggle over the
succession to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which could
well mark the beginning of the end of the “Khomeini generation”;
the selection and approval of the presidential candidates for the 2005
elections; continued attempts by reformists, so far futile, to modify
the legislative process at the expense of the clerical establishment
and in favor of popular will; and the ability of the political elite to
forestall the demands of the educated and growing numbers of postrevolutionary Iranians. Of course, exogenous events also shape any
nation’s destiny, particularly those of the magnitude of the U.S.-led
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military campaign to topple Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime
in neighboring Iraq. Although events on the ground are moving
quickly, I will briefly outline the immediate impact and likely future
effects of the Iraq war and its aftermath on Iran’s domestic political
scene.
Finally, I will discuss the implications of the expected course of
Iranian affairs―most charitably seen as “muddling through” and
deferring the most difficult political, social, and religious questions
as long as possible―on one of the pressing issues facing Washington
decisionmakers: Iran’s relationship to the United States. It is worth
noting that whenever its own core values are involved, Iran remains
for the most part highly immunized against outside interference in
both its domestic affairs and its foreign policy.
Domestic Politics: Islam versus Islam.
Amid the chaos of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and its dizzying
aftermath, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini
was a radical―not just politically, but in religious terms. In the face
of almost universal opposition among the handful of recognized
senior Shi’ite theologians in Iran and Iraq, he single-handedly
revolutionized the role of the clergy and stood the entire notion
of relations between traditionally quietist Shi’ism and the state,
corrupt by religious definition and prone to error and sin, on its
head. Begun in the 1940s and refined in 1970 during his exile to the
Iraqi holy city of Najaf, Khomeini’s vision extended the clergy’s
traditional authority over orphans, the insane or anyone else unable
to fend for himself―an established principle known as velayat, or
guardianship―to society as a whole.
Against the traditional role for the clerics as moral guides and
intercessors on behalf of the people with an inherently corrupt
political authority, Khomeini proposed that the clergy should
assume direct political power, in what would become the first
theocracy of the modern age. In other words, the clergy and the state
would become one and the same. To the majority of Shi’ite thinkers
this was blasphemy; the sacred texts make it clear that with the final
disappearance of the last of the community’s rightful leaders, the
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sainted 12 Imams, in 941 AD, no mere mortal could unite temporal
and religious authority in one office. Nonetheless, Khomeini pressed
ahead, skillfully exploiting the weakness and divisions among both
his clerical and secular opponents, with a speed and finality that
surprised even his most ardent supporters; few if any had expected to
live to see this blueprint for religious government enacted. With the
ratification of Iran’s new Islamic constitution in 1979, the principle of
supreme clerical rule―the velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the
jurisconsult―was established in law. It provides for an appointed
senior Shi’ite cleric and expert in Islamic law to have final say over
almost all state affairs, including control over the security forces and
the right to declare war. These powers were further buttressed by
constitutional revision in 1988-1989, in preparation for the succession
after Khomeni’s death.
The velayat-e faqih remains the most prominent feature of Iran’s
political system, providing the state with what its supporters say is
an Islamic essence. Hard-line theoreticians refer to this system as
a “guided” republic, to distinguish it from the liberal, democratic
republics of the West, with the supreme leader and the many state
organs he controls responsible for guiding the nation along the
righteous path. This attempt to co-opt the established role of Shi’ite
clerics as moral guides, however, has failed to win over traditional
theologians, who abhor their fellow clerics wielding political
authority. Practical-minded critics among them also point to the
very real risk to the standing of the clerical caste once it assumes
responsibility for the state; the inevitable failures and set-backs of
statesmanship cannot but tarnish the clergy’s standing in the eyes of
the people. Finally, the traditionalists and many of their allies fear
that Shi’ism is in danger of being reduced to a state ideology, a grave
threat to a faith that has long prided itself on its independence, its
intellectual rigor and its ability to adapt to the changing circumstances
of life.
Together, these “traditionalists” make up by far the single
biggest of the three clerical factions; the others are the “hardliners” now in charge of the state, and the “reformists” seeking to
liberalize and modernize―but not supplant―the existing Islamic
order. True to their quietest credo, the traditionalists refrain from
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outward expression of their opposition to the velayat. What’s more,
these traditionalists―comprising a large body of senior clerics, their
seminary students, and followers―could not be expected to ally
themselves with any political reform that failed to respect Shi’ite
religious and cultural values. Thus, they represent an unlikely source
of anti-regime mobilization, although the steady accumulation
of religious opposition to direct clerical rule may one day pose a
serious threat to the legitimacy of the current order.
While the religious critique of supreme clerical rule dates back
decades, more recently, the velayat has also become a target on political
grounds among pro-reform clerics and many lay intellectuals, who
see its present incarnation as a recipe for despotism and a violation
of the democratic promise of the revolution. A number of former
seminary students of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a
revolutionary-turned-dissident recently freed from house arrest for
challenging the religious credentials of the present supreme leader,
have developed a damaging critique of absolute clerical rule in an
attempt to reform and modernize the Islamic political system. Most
prominent among these are the mid-ranking clerics Abdollah Nouri
and Mohsen Kadivar, the latter of whom was recently a visiting
scholar at Harvard University.
Lay political activists, taking advantage of a brief period of press
freedom during President Khatami’s early years in office, brought
the critiques of Kadivar, Nouri, and their allies from out behind the
walls of the seminary and exposed them to the Iranian public for the
first time. They also added their own opposition, drawn from their
political commitment to expanded personal and social freedom, the
rule of law and the need for a civil society within an Islamic order.
Many are well-versed in the political philosophy of the West, which
they have sought to harness for their own needs. At the same time,
they are critical of what they see as the excessive freedom of the West
and of its threat to traditional cultural and religious values.
These critics of the present clerical system advocate a greater
degree of public participation in political life through a number
of reforms that include: popular election of the supreme leader
and the imposition of term limits on the office; watering down
or removing the power to veto parliamentary legislation by the
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clerics of the Guardian Council controlled by the Leader; an end
to the “vetting” of candidates for parliament and the presidency
by this same council; the removal of direct clerical control over
the judiciary; and the strengthening of the powers of the elected
president, as a counter-weight to the appointed Supreme Leader.
The result, say proponents, would be a fundamental rebalancing
of the relationship between the people and the clergy and more
representative of a true “Islamic republic,” as envisioned by the
broad coalition that overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah. Interestingly
enough, many of these proposals were reflected in the first drafts of
the post-revolutionary constitution (and some were drawn from the
experience of the 1906-11 Constitutional Revolution), only to be lost
in Khomeini’s unexpected push for his maximalist demands of the
velayat-e faqih.
After a period of disarray following the 1997 presidential
landslide by the reformist cleric Mohammad Khatami, the hardline establishment soon regained its footing. Relying on the organs
of executive power under their control, chiefly the judiciary, the
Guardian Council, and the security apparatus, they nullified the
president’s popular mandate for change and thwarted pro-reform
legislation passed by parliament. Special clerical courts answering to
the Leader, once dubbed the “Islamic Inquisition” by the pro-reform
press, began the steady prosecution of religious dissent within the
clerical ranks. Political opposition was quashed, with reformist
leaders hauled before courts, thrown into prison or even murdered
by death squads tied to the intelligence service. The leader and his
circle also deployed gangs of religious zealots to break up political
or religious protests, as well as the more formal Islamic militia, the
basij. Both were used to great effect to ruthlessly suppress the July
1999 student protests that rocked Tehran and other major cities.
By April 2000, the hard-liners felt sufficiently strong to undo the
most noteworthy achievement of the Khatami era, forcing the mass
closure of dozens of independent newspapers and prosecuting
leading editors, publishers, and commentators. Not long after, the
president publicly confessed he had no real power. The political
critique of absolute clerical rule was forced back into the shadows,
and the dream of reform among ordinary Iranians was in tatters.
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Disillusioned with this failure, very few of Khatami’s constituents
bothered to vote in the latest municipal elections, which were held
in March 2003, leaving the field to big conservative gains.
Nor is the regime likely to face any danger from the frequent but
scattered economic and social protests that erupt regularly among
ordinary people, often in the less developed towns, villages, and
urban neighborhoods. These are generally provoked by a breakdown
in municipal services, by corruption, or heavy-handed police tactics,
fed by underlying frustration at persistently low living standards,
high unemployment, and a widening disparity in income and
opportunity. To date, such protests have been completely devoid of
any political demands and there have been no attempts by the elites
of any stripe to try to tap into this autarkic dissatisfaction.
In sharp contrast to the run-up to the Islamic Revolution, the
fruit of a “theology of discontent” decades in the making among
many classes and factions, domestic politics in Iran today remains
very much restricted to the narrow circle of “insiders.” I will discuss
the failure of the reform movement in detail in Part IV below, but
it is worth noting here that the unwillingness, or inability, of the
so-called reformers to acknowledge or give voice to this popular
discontent has doomed them to impotence. With the primary forms
of potential opposition―theological, political and socio-economic―
all muffled, Iran’s national struggle has come down to an elite affair,
best described as the struggle of Islam versus Islam.
The Structure of the State.
Iran’s Islamic constitution provides an extraordinary
concentration of executive power not in the hands of the elected
president but in those of the Supreme Leader, or vali-ye faqih,
appointed by a council of clerics dominated by hard-liners. In fact,
the Iranian president wields less real power than perhaps any other
elected chief executive in the world. This new constitution defines
the Islamic Republic as a new kind of state, one ruled by qualified
Islamic jurists until the missing Twelfth Imam, the last rightful
ruler who disappeared in 941, makes his anticipated return to earth
to usher in the age of perfect justice. The vali-ye faqih was given
authority over the three branches of government, with specific
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rights and duties detailed in Article 110. These include the right to
appoint a Guardian Council, a body dominated by clerics to ensure
parliament passes no laws or regulations in violation of the sharia,
the Muslim holy law; supreme command over the military and the
security forces, with the power to declare war and make peace; and
the authority to confirm or reject the election of the president.
The Islamic constitution also creates a series of interlocking
clerical bodies, ultimately controlled by the vali-ye faqih, at the
expense of popular sovereignty as envisioned by many of Khomeni’s
lay revolutionary allies. In addition to the Guardian Council, which
sits above the elected parliament and which has ultimate authority
over both interpretation of the constitution and national elections, the
law calls for a clerical Assembly of Leadership Experts, designed to
select the leader and then supervise his work. Finally, the document
mandates that all five seats on the Supreme Court and the office of
prosecutor general be filled by Islamic jurists, with the head of the
court and the prosecutor both direct appointees of the leader.
The completion of the final draft constitution by the Assembly
of Experts, under the energetic leadership of Khomeini’s star
pupil, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, bequeathed the world the
first theocracy of the modern age. But the haste with which it was
thrown together, with some delegates virtually tripping over one
another to add more and more power to a supreme office earmarked
for Khomeini, left the constitution a deeply flawed document, rife
with legal shortcomings and outright contradictions. The most
serious problems revolve around the remnants of a more liberal,
democratic version, which can be found in the final document,
only to be undermined elsewhere by the qualification that they
be “consistent with Islamic standards.” Specifically, these sections
had to do with the rights and sovereignty of the people. Article 56,
for example, notes that God alone exercises absolute power to rule
over men, power that he has delegated to the people at large, not
to the Islamic jurists. Other key articles also invoke the will of the
Iranian people as the source of the state’s legitimacy, as expressed
in popular elections for president and the parliament. Finally, the
text devotes considerable attention to the fundamental rights of the
people, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and
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freedom to form political parties. None of these rights has ever been
fully respected, but their very presence and the presence of other
expressions of popular sovereignty have left Iran’s political system
unstable and subject to future challenges on both religious and
political grounds.
With the end of his life drawing near, Khomeini came to realize
that there were no prominent religious figures who could fulfill the
political requirements of his office; after all, most of the senior clergy
remained cool, to say the least, to the idea of religious government. So
in a stunning about-face, Khomeini severed the connection between
the most senior clergy―the sources of religious emulation―and the
office of supreme ruler, a link that had always been presented as
central to his conception of Islamic government. Khomeini ordered
a revision of the constitution, creating by decree a special assembly
to do the job. The mission was clear: rework the law of the land to
pave the way for his designated successor, the mid-ranking cleric,
Ali Khamenei. Article 109, requiring the leader to be selected from
among the senior-most clerics, the marjas, was scrapped. Other
articles that would have allowed for a collective clerical leadership, a
return to idea of the clergy as a whole as the “general representative”
of the Imams, were also jettisoned. The powers of the leader were
strengthened further at the expense of the elected president, while
the office of prime minister was eliminated altogether. The revisions
also abolished the judicial council that oversaw the work of the
courts and the prosecutors, replacing it with a single judiciary chief
answering only to the leader. Further changes gave the vali-ye faqih
explicit authority to delineate the general policies of the Islamic
Republic and to supervise implementation of those policies, as well
as the right to appoint the head of the state broadcasting monopoly.
This further centralization of power has left the institution of
the velayat-e faqih virtually impregnable to any foreseeable political
challenge. The pro-democracy student riots of July 1999, the
worst social unrest since the aftermath of the revolution, provide
an excellent case in point. Despite the fury of the street protests,
which caught many at home and abroad by surprise, the regime
had no real difficulty in suppressing the outbreaks and in ensuring
that nothing on such a scale would be repeated anytime soon.
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Nor did the students’ demands for greater freedom of expression
and less clerical interference in their daily lives resonate among
the population at large or among the pro-reform “insiders,” who
immediately distanced themselves from the protesters. Relying on its
total domination of the police and the security apparatus, as well as
the volunteer Islamic basij militia and the less formal vigilante forces
based in neighborhood mosques, the regime crushed the student
protests in a matter of days. Brutal tactics, including beatings,
torture, lengthy imprisonment, and the threat of death sentences,
halted any incipient opposition movement in its tracks. Many
Western observers took the student protests, however truncated, as
a sign of a growing demand on the part of Iran’s huge youth cohort
for a secular society. In fact, my extensive interviews with campus
activists and ordinary students during and after the July unrest
made it clear the vast majority of educated youth were demanding
greater social and political freedom within an Islamic context; they
want an Islamic system, just not this Islamic system.
Khomeini’s reworking of the constitution also reflects the
often-overlooked flexibility of the ruling circles, another factor in
their longevity. To justify the radical changes needed for a smooth
handover of power after his death, the ailing leader cited the
overriding need to ensure the survival of the Islamic political system.
In doing so, he invoked the religious principle of expediency, or
maslahat. Clearly, it was in the best interests of the Islamic Republic to
have an orderly transition, even at the risk of undermining religious
practice. Likewise, maslahat was at work when, in a direct slight
to the established clerical system, Khamenei was given the title of
ayatollah despite his lack of religious and scholarly credentials. To
the chagrin of the clerical critics of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini
and his allies had long resorted to maslahat whenever the practical
needs or interests of the Iranian state clashed with the traditional
teachings of Shi’ite Islam. This was as true for such fundamental
issues as taxation and banking, on which religious law places
explicit if inconvenient restrictions, as it was for the prohibitions
against music and chess, both of which were later waived in the
face of social reality. In one notable ruling, it was decreed that soccer
players and wrestlers, who enjoy enormous popular followings in
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Iran, were not in violation of religious law when they wore shorts or
other immodest clothing required for their sport. Nor was watching
such events on television or in person a violation of the sharia.
As tensions began to mount between the traditional reading
of Islamic law, as championed by the Guardian Council, and the
demands of modern legislation approved by the elected parliament,
Khomeini was forced increasingly to step in to bridge the gap. In
January 1988, he implemented a startling and far-reaching measure
to protect his young republic, declaring that a genuine Islamic state
had the right to disregard religious law when passing legislation.
Whatever was in the interest―or maslahat
maslahat―of maintaining the ruling
Islamic order, he argued, represented the “most important of God’s
ordinances” and took precedence over all others “derived or directly
commanded by Allah.” One month later, he institutionalized this
principle by creating an Expediency Council to determine the
interests of state and break deadlocks between parliament and the
Guardians. The Expediency Council, whose members are chosen
directly by the leader, was also accorded legislative powers of its
own. This new body, with the reliable Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani at
its head, was then given legal sanction in the revised constitution.
The enormous concentration of power in the hands of the
establishment clerics, led by Khamenei and his allies, has provided
the regime with more than enough tools to head off any challenge to
its authority. It has also successfully thwarted the reform movement
and its attempts to introduce greater popular participation and
greater pluralism. After the unexpected setback of the 1997 Khatami
landslide, the hard-liners soon realized they retained all the legal
authority they needed to regain the upper hand, and they did so
decisively. Their efforts were assisted by the mainstream reform
movement, which, true to its “insider” roots and tone deaf to
popular demands, declared at the outset its opposition to any
attempt to revise the constitution. As a result, any significant reform
will remain more a matter of negotiation within the narrow circle
of competing elites than an endeavor fuelled by public demand,
popular vote or protest.
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The Failure of Internal Reform.
With deep structural change in the form of constitutional revision
off the table from the start, the pro-reform movement with Khatami
at its symbolic head nonetheless squandered perhaps the best chance
in a generation for internal reform. With almost 70% of the popular
vote in May 1997 for his reformist platform, Khatami failed to take
advantage of the opening and the disarray among his hard-line
rivals. Instead of pressing quickly to implement campaign pledges
to introduce the rule of law and to begin building a civil society
before the conservatives could regroup, the new administration
and its allies settled for half-measures. A letter from a prominent
member of the radical wing of the Khatami coalition argued the
president-elect faced serious obstacles that could be addressed only
by swift and resolute action. These recommendations included a
major foreign policy address denouncing terrorism and proclaiming
Iran’s readiness for relations with all nations on the basis of mutual
respect; creating true political parties; promoting freedom in the
universities; introducing independent newspapers and radio and
television stations; and banning the Islamic vigilante groups that
oppressed society at every turn. With the exception of a policy of
press freedom, all of the other measures were stalled or ignored
completely; even the opening of independent newspapers―arguably
the one short-lived success of the Khatami era―was seriously
delayed by bickering within the reformist camp.
The March local elections in Iran marked the formal low point
for the reform movement led by Khatami and his allies. During my
almost 3 years in Iran, from 1998 to early 2001, the capital, Tehran,
was a hotbed of pro-reform political activism. But this time, just 12
percent of eligible voters bothered to cast ballots, a far cry from the
heavy turnout that characterized the president’s first election, or
later polls for local councils and parliament. Across Iran, candidates
associated with Khatami fared poorly, while those aligned with the
conservative faction gained strength, even capturing the high-profile
office of Tehran mayor.
Such dismal results on the part of the reformist project should
have come as no surprise. Their seeds, in fact, were sown as far
back as the summer of 1999, when Khatami virtually turned
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his back on his most ardent supporters, the nation’s university
students who had taken to the streets to press the president’s own
demands for freedom and tolerance, and cast his lot with the ruling
establishment. In a fateful address in the city of Hamadan on July
27, 1999, Khatami marked both the defining moment in his tenure
and a turning point for the mainstream reform movement. A huge
crowd of mostly male students crammed the local soccer stadium to
await the president. Many chanted, “Khatami, we love you,” under
the baking sun; they were certain the president would endorse their
aspirations and commiserate in their losses at the hands of the police
and the vigilantes. But when he took the podium, Khatami stunned
his audience with a strong endorsement of the status quo. Instead
of instilling confidence in his foot soldiers, who had just risked
their lives fighting in the streets for change, the president chose to
rewrite the history of the pro-democracy protests, denying what
many―including this author―had seen with their own eyes. “My
dear ones, today in order to put down the riots and to put out the
flames of violence for the nation, others use tanks, armored cars and
heavy weapons. Our forces did not use firearms to tackle the rioting.
The disturbance was put down calmly.”
Khatami went on to dismiss the pro-democracy protests in
Tehran as the work of thugs. “It was an ugly and offensive incident,
which marred the image of our dear, patient, rational people . . . It
was to express vengeance toward the system. It had nothing to do
with the honorable nation or the university students.” Many of the
president’s more militant supporters were stunned. Had not the
students risked all to take their grievances beyond the walls of the
universities and go directly to the people? Had they not protested to
secure the very rights the president had affirmed was their legal due
within the Islamic political system?
Over time, I watched as Khatami steadily abandoned his core
supporters who had first put him in office―the religious intellectuals,
including many prominent newspaper editors, publishers and
commentators, as well as reform-minded clerics, feminists, and
lay political activists. In one particularly poignant moment, two
leading newspapermen, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin and Hamid Reza
Jalaiepour sent a plaintive letter to the president, whose agenda they
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had pushed relentlessly, asking for his protection from the hardliners in the police and the courts.
These were brave men, ready to risk prosecution for their proreform convictions. Jalaiepour, a big, gregarious man, kept a kit bag
with a razor and toothbrush by his desk in case he was hauled off
by the police. And both did time in jail. Yet, they could not disguise
their hurt and anger that they had been abandoned by the symbolic
head of the reform movement. “Either tell us that our press activities
are illegal . . . or tell us clearly from which government body we are
to get a minimum of political and professional security to continue
our work.” They had taken Khatami at his word and pursued his
promise of reform to its logical conclusions. With the police virtually
knocking on their door, they asked, where was the president now?
Khatami never responded.
When Election Day rolled around this March, millions of
ordinary Iranians, who often took their cues from the political and
cultural elite, voted with their feet and stayed away from the polls.
How had it all gone so wrong?
At least four factors contributed to this failure. First, Khatami
was a loyal product of the system he sought to reform. Second, his
commitment to―and understanding of―the broader reform project
and its theological, social, and political implications was always
in doubt. Third, the obstacles to profound structural change, in
particular those posed by the country’s constitution that all but
guaranteed the hold of the hard-line clerics, were enormous. And
finally, the president and his allies failed to build a firm foundation
for their proposed Islamic civil society, eschewing the timeconsuming work of creating genuine political parties and grassroots
organizations and instead relying on a sort of media campaign―in
this case, the formation of an independent press―to carry the day.
On a cold winter day in 1997, Mohammad Khatami presented
himself to Iran’s supreme clerical leader at the latter’s residence
in Jamaran, once a village but now part of the sprawling capital,
Tehran. He was considering a run for the presidency but had told
his backers he was determined to give the leader, who has the final
word in all matters of state, the chance to veto his candidacy from
the start. He told Ayatollah Khamenei that his message of tolerance,
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pluralism, and openness could draw Iranians, who had grown
increasingly apathetic and cynical, back into the political system. He
would also reach out to women and ethnic minorities, broadening
popular support for the Islamic system and, by extension, for the
leader himself. The leader, like everyone else in Iran, assumed
Khatami could never win, and he gave the candidate his blessing to
run while making no comment on his election platform. The result
was the landslide victory of May 1997.
It is important to recognize that the reforms that came to be
associated with the campaign of 1997 and the person of Mohammad
Khatami represent only one of several key strands that made up the
coalition of clerics, workers, leftist militias, secular and religious
intellectuals, Iranian nationalists and university students who
carried out the Islamic Revolution almost 2 decades earlier. For
years, any push toward greater democracy, pluralism, and the rule
of law were subordinated first to the demands of consolidating
the revolution and purifying society of Western influence, as well
as to the struggle with the Great Satan in the aftermath of the U.S.
Embassy takeover. The bloody Iran-Iraq war, which dragged on for
8 years, further retarded the nascent reform movement. It was only
with the end of the war in 1988 and the death in 1989 of Khomeini―a
man, his son records, who was broken by the failure to bring down
Saddam Hussein―that the reformers began to find their voice.
However, the tensions within the Khatami coalition began to
show within days of its stunning electoral victory. Activists like
Shamasolvaezin and Jalaiepour were impatient to push the reformist
agenda. They argued for the immediate creation of a political party
and the formation of grassroots organizations. But they were vetoed
by powerful rivals inside the Khatami camp, who feared alarming
the clerical establishment and diluting their own political power.
Instead, the two men, joined by the U.S.-educated engineer Mohsen
Sazegara, poured their enormous energies into creating the first
truly modern newspapers of the post-revolutionary era.
This was, it turned out, a fateful decision, for it represented the
path of least resistance and distracted the reform movement from
the more basic building blocks of their proposed civil society, such
as true political parties and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).
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For Khatami, himself a former newspaper publisher, and the other
intellectuals and activists who supported him, the written word
was a seductive device. A free press, they argued, would mobilize
public opinion, act as a check on arbitrary state power, and energize
a society beaten down by revolution, war, death, and suffering.
Sports, Western movie stars, pro-reform clerics, and biting political
commentary all competed for readers’ attention. “We were thinking
about happiness and life, instead of sadness and death―to publicize
life,” Sazegara told us. “We were thinking of a kind of renaissance
by happiness.” The result, the color daily newspaper Jameah, was a
spectacular success. Daily circulation quickly hit 100,000, the paper’s
break-even point, on its way to 300,000 and beyond. Plans for an
independent publishing house, a political club, and a lecture series,
all affiliated with Jameah, began to take shape.
The hard-line authorities soon recognized the danger. The election
of Khatami was bad enough, they reasoned, but the unbridled voice
of a truly independent press was another matter all together. Backed
by the supreme leader, the Tehran prosecutor closed the newspaper
and its successor and jailed its founders. So began a game of cat and
mouse between the pro-reform press and the hard-liners in control of
the courts. Religious imperative was also invoked to silence dissent,
and many editors and publishers were jailed on charges of violating
Islamic values.
The early Khatami years saw an explosion of independent
newspapers and journals. These publications introduced educated
Iranians to the reformist ideas and modernist theological debate that
had once been restricted to private reading circles or hidden behind
the walls of the religious seminaries. Corruption at the highest levels
was exposed, and the powerful chief of the feared secret service was
brought down in a murder scandal uncovered by the press. But
one by one, these newspapers and magazines fell to the entrenched
power of the clerical establishment, which exercised power through
the un-elected institutions under its control, chiefly through the
judiciary. In April 2000, these “press wars” closed dozens of
publications. Prominent editors, publishers and commentators were
hauled before the courts. The crowning achievement of the Khatami
years was over.
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Seven months later, I sat in the audience as the president
confessed before a conference of lawyers and religious jurists that
he had failed. His campaign promises to introduce the rule of law
and create a civil society had proven empty. “After three and a
half years,” a grim-faced Khatami said, “I must be clear that the
president does not have enough rights to carry out the heavy task on
my shoulders.”
Markers and Roadmaps.
A number of factors and events bear watching by U.S.
policymakers as they study the roadmap ahead. These include:
•

The selection of presidential candidates for the election of
Spring 2005. The Guardian Council of conservative clerics
has established its right to vet all candidates for parliament
and the presidency, and it has acted aggressively to defend
the interests of the establishment. In 1997, it barred all
but four of 238 hopefuls. A Council member told me the
inclusion of Mohammad Khatami―whom virtually everyone,
including the candidate and his inner circle, assumed would
lose―among the finalists was the single biggest mistake in
the panel’s history. How will the hard-line clerics handle
pro-reform candidates this time? Will they risk further
alienating an already apathetic and dispirited electorate? Can
they prevent a qualified lay candidate, or will they retain the
clerical monopoly on the post?

•

The eventual secession to the Supreme Leader. Born in
1939, Khamenei remains relatively young. He appears to
have recovered from unknown health problems―rumors in
Tehran included cancer but these could not be confirmed―
that plagued him in the late 1990s and looks more vigorous
than he was at that time. However, a smooth transition is vital
to political stability. The steady loss of religious authority by
the Leader’s office suggests any successor would come from
among the “political mullahs.” Any deviation from this
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toward a figure more acceptable in religious terms, or a return
to the earlier notion of a ruling clerical council in place of a
single Leader, would be highly significant.
•

The reform movement has mounted a series of so far
unsuccessful challenges to the supervisory and veto powers
of the hard-line clerics on the Guardian Council. A frustrated
Khatami has repeatedly threatened to put the matter to public
referendum, or even to resign, to break the deadlock between
popular and clerical power. It is unclear whether such a
referendum could be held at all, or what its impact might be.
The resignation ploy appears a doomed gambit; the president
has already lost so much credibility with ordinary Iranians,
and he has issued similar threats before without following
through. Any steps, however unlikely, to rebalance the
relationship between the Islamic state and the Islamic republic
are worth noting.

•

More than half of the Iranian population is under 25, with
no memory of the Islamic Revolution and little real recall, if
any, of Khomeini. This second generation of the Revolution
has little or no commitment to the values and ideals of the
ruling elites. Many are well educated, thanks to an extensive
university system, and the system must find a way to meet
their economic, social, and political aspirations. However, it is
vital to stress again that the common Western argument, that
this generation has rejected Islam and yearns for a secular
Iran, is completely without foundation. Rather, today’s youth
want greater freedom of expression, cultural and political
pluralism, and more economic opportunity―attributes they
believe are compatible with their religious and cultural values.
How effectively will the regime absorb this new generation, or
will it continue to sit back as the best and the brightest pursue
opportunity overseas in a debilitating “brain drain”? Will this
new generation make common cause with other disaffected
elements of society? Or will its most ambitious members
simply seek their place among the “insiders,” a trend already
visible among a number of campus leaders today?
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Domestic Politics and U.S.-Iran Relations.
Despite more than 2 decades of hostility and the lack of
diplomatic ties, the U.S.-Iranian relationship is a defining force in
the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. It also represents a huge, if
often unstated, presence in the domestic affairs of the nation. Here in
Washington, that primacy has long fostered the mistaken notion that
the United States can exert considerable influence over the terms of
any bilateral relationship and over Iran’s internal affairs as part of
any future rapprochement. In fact, the Islamic Republic is almost
impervious to conventional outside pressure, particularly from
the “Great Satan.” Armed with its revolutionary and anti-colonial
ideology and insulated against the general desire among ordinary
Iranians for a resumption of ties, the ruling elite must sort out this
matter within its own ranks.
Each faction is continually weighing the costs and benefits for
itself―not for the nation―and calculating the risks and uncertainties
involved. For example, the influential bazaari merchants, who
dominate much of the domestic economy and enjoy close ties to the
clerical establishment, are clearly tempted by the potential rewards of
expanded foreign trade; but they also realize their dominant positions
in commerce and capital formation could easily be overshadowed
by a complete opening to the outside and the arrival of American
banking giants. While most reformist politicians generally favor an
end to Iran’s isolation and xenophobic foreign policies, they remain
deeply anti-American (many were former hostage-takers, and
they have replaced the anti-British views of their forefathers with
intense distrust of the United States). The Supreme Leader, often
among the most shrill of anti-American voices, remains fearful that
restored ties would undermine Iran’s religious and cultural values.
At the same time, each faction wants to be sure that it controls the
relationship, in order to channel the benefits toward its supporters
and to accrue the political gains for ending the deadlock. Only when
a broad consensus is reached among these “insiders,” will there be
movement on the American front, and it will certainly not come at a
cost of major concessions on the part of Iran.
This phenomenon underscores the futility of periodic U.S.
overtures, often to the more pragmatic conservatives like former
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president Rafanjani (“a man we can do business with”), or to his
successor Khatami, whose reformist platform has led many in
Washington to see him as a “democrat” and thus a natural ally. It
also invalidates the conventional wisdom among Western diplomats
in Tehran that appeals to Iran’s national interests will inevitably
draw the country closer to the United States. A botched attempt by
the Clinton White House to establish a secret channel to Khatami
soon leaked to the conservatives, prompting the Supreme Leader to
issue a blistering public attack on America and to launch a damaging
witch hunt against Western “bases” among the reformist faction.
In February 2000, a U.S. message of congratulations to the
reform movement for its relatively strong showing in parliamentary
elections completely overshadowed the event itself. As a result, the
reformers were forced to use their victory press conference, called to
lay out an ambitious legislative agenda before the people and a huge
international press corps, to assert their anti-American credentials
and deny they were Western lackeys. Similarly, any goodwill from
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s attempt in March of that year
to voice regret for the U.S. role in the 1953 coup that restored the
Shah was completely squandered by references in that same speech
to undemocratic elements among Iran’s ruling circles, remarks
that outraged the entire Iranian elite. The most recent attempt
by Washington to shape the Iranian political landscape came last
summer, with a declaration by President Bush that America was
effectively abandoning any support for Khatami and the reform
movement and calling on the Iranian people to overthrow their
government. For the reasons outlined earlier in this chapteer, this
bid will likewise fail.
If the troubled bilateral relationship and the Islamic Republic’s
domestic policies remain largely immune to overt U.S. suasion,
then what of Iran’s foreign policy? U.S interests and concerns lie in
several specific areas: the possible export of the Islamic Revolution,
with its model of authoritarian clerical rule; and Tehran’s response
to events in postwar Iraq.
The overthrow of the Shah and the rise of clerical power that
followed deeply alarmed Muslim rulers across the Middle East, as
well as their Western backers. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
and Bahrain―all with sizeable and restive Shi’ite populations―were
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terrified that Khomeini’s call for worldwide Islamic revolution
threatened their grip on power. The authoritarian leaders of Sunni
states like Egypt and Jordan, long denounced by Islamist activists as
corrupt and religiously illegitimate, were also badly shaken. After
all, the leader of the Islamic Revolution saw himself as the leading
voice for the global ummah, or Muslim community of believers,
rather than just a the new head of state. Millions of Muslims, both
Shi’ite and Sunni, were inspired by the Iranian experience. Over
time, however, this vision began to crumble under the weight of the
Iranian model’s declining religious authority, its practical setbacks
in running a state, and the need to focus increasingly on domestic
problems and issues. In the early 1990s, Supreme Leader Khamenei
formally renounced the export of the revolution, and today Iran’s
relations with its neighbors are defined less by ideology than by
traditional geopolitics.
While events in predominantly Shi’ite southern Iraq have
reignited fears in some quarters of a resurgence of revolutionary
fervor on the part of Iran, recent history suggests the Islamic
Republic would be more than content to see a stable, non-hostile
Iraq on its border, regardless of the structure or form of government
there. And, in fact, Khatami said as much on his just-completed visit
to Lebanon, where he held talks with state officials as well as with
the leaders of the Shi’ite movement Hezbollah. The president called
for a democratic Iraq, based on the principle of “one man, one vote.”
This mirrors the latest public comments by Ayatollah Mohammad
Bakr al-Hakim, a Shi’ite cleric and the leader of the Supreme Council
of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
Hakim fled to Iran after the failed Shi’ite rebellion, encouraged
by Washington in 1991, against Saddam Hussein, and he directs a
formidable political and militia organization. His status as an exile
opposition figure in Tehran for more than a decade, before his return
to postwar Iraq, often obscures the fact that Hakim and SCIRI are
not simply puppets of their former hosts in Tehran. As the scion
of a leading clerical family in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf, Hakim
commands both religious and popular support, while SCIRI’S role in
armed resistance to the Baathist regime has conferred considerable
political legitimacy on the group. Hakim should not be viewed as a
mere stalking horse for Iranian-style clerical rule in Iraq. Nor is he
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likely to seek any veto over a pluralistic postwar government.
On a more fundamental level, the fall of Saddam Hussein, who
brutally suppressed the Shi’ite leadership, could open the way to a
return of Najaf as a leading Shi’ite religious and intellectual center.
The Iraqi city, site of the shrine to the Shi’ite saint, Imam Ali, had lost
its standing in 1922 when its most active members were effectively
forced out by the British. Many, including the young Ruhollah
Khomeini, relocated to the sleepy Iranian town of Qom, which soon
became a vital center of religious learning and later an important
hub of revolutionary activity.
If Najaf once again regains its seat at the center of the Shiite
world, a Qom-Najaf corridor would influence the role of Shiite Islam
in the region and solidify the Shi’ite influence over a postwar Iraqi
government.
Conclusion.
In conclusion, religion will continue to play an important role
in the domestic affairs inside Iran and the region. The strength of
the clerical establishment should not be underestimated. Thus, any
notions that Iran is on the verge of a second revolution which would
prompt the fall of the clerics is unrealistic. Such a proposition is put
forth by Iranian ex-patriots whose secular orientation has blinded
them to the realities of Iran over the last 2 decades. Similarly, the
proposition that Iran’s younger generation is awaiting the chance
to overthrow the regime and could do so with a little push from the
United States, is also a false assumption. For all the reasons stated in
this chapter, Iran’s youth are not seeking a secular state but rather
a reformed Islamic system which takes into account their religious
and cultural values while also meeting their needs in the modern
world. Furthermore, history in Iran and the history of revolutions
have shown that it takes far more than unhappy people to foment
revolutions. A broad-based social movement, comprised of workers,
secularists, students, and modernist clerics, would be necessary to
carry out a revolution. Such a coalition is absent in Iran and there is
no indication that one is on the horizon.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN
S. Rob Sobhani
The people are very dissatisfied, and they are right to be so, and
I swear to God that the society is on the brink of explosion. If this
discontent increases, as is the case, the regime will be threatened.
Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini
Assembly of Experts
(Power to Appoint
Supreme Leader) 2002

Introduction.
The question before us today is: What are the prospects of Iran’s
revolutionary government giving way to reform or overthrow over
the next 10-20 years? Furthermore, and more importantly for the
United States, what groups and forces within Iran are opposed to
the current revolutionary government and/or its efforts to develop
nuclear power and long-range strategic weapons systems?
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Iran’s
revolutionary government can be overthrown within 2 years
should the United States adopt a more robust policy of empowering
the Iranian people to change the regime in Tehran. A regime change
in Iran would put an immediate end to Iran’s pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction and instead focus the efforts of the new secular
government on the domestic priority of pulling Iran out of its
current Third World status. Equally important, the demise of the
Islamic Republic of Iran at the hands of the Iranian people would
send a very powerful message to the rest of the Muslim world that
Islam, as a form of governance, has failed. The failure of political
Islam would be a victory for the United States and our war against
Islamic fundamentalism.
The end result of a more robust policy on Iran would allow
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President Bush to look the American people in the eyes and state the
following: “On September 11, 2001, an arc of tyranny and dictatorship
stretched from Afghanistan through Iran into Iraq. Today, an arc of
freedom rules in Kabul, Tehran, and Baghdad. And the world is a
safer and better place as are the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran, and
Iraq.”
Iran: Challenge and Opportunity.
Militant Islam is today’s engine of international terror. Islamist
schools breed a new militant generation, Islamist sermons mobilize
opinion against the free world, Islamist ideology legitimizes recourse
to terror and Islamist “charities” bankroll the global network of
terror. While most Muslim states are aware of this threat to the
world and their own stability, there is one that is actually governed
by Islamists: The Islamic Republic of Iran.
Therefore, the principal component of the war against terrorism
should be the war against militant Islam, which over the last 20
decades has been inspired, nurtured, and funded by the Islamic
Government of Iran. The demise of the clerical regime in Iran would
go a long way in “draining the swamp” of militancy and radicalism in
the broader Muslim world with enormous geopolitical consequences
for U.S. national security interests. Therefore, the permanent success
of this campaign rests on a regime change in Iran.
In short, the United States faces two immediate timelines: one, the
mullahs’ access to a nuclear bomb, and the other, institutionalization
of democracy through a regime change. The fundamental goal of
U.S. foreign policy should be the acceleration of the regime change
timeline.
In many respects, the people of Iran face a similar set of timelines.
The choices facing Iran over the next 10-20 years are simple: a
country relegated to permanent Third World status with a nuclear
bomb or an advanced, modern, secular country at peace with itself
and its neighbors.
The geopolitical interests of the United States coincide with the
interests of a majority of Iranians: a fundamental change in the nature
of the regime in Tehran. The overthrow of the Islamic Republic of
Iran is good for America and good for the Iranian people. Therefore,
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Washington’s strategy should be to support those forces inside and
outside Iran which share America’s political, economic, military,
and geopolitical vision for the region. Towards this end, the United
States must continue to isolate the clerical regime and encourage the
growing spirit of rebellion among the repressed Iranians.
Assumptions.
1. Unwilling to pursue serious dialogue on normalizing relations
with Washington, Tehran’s foreign policy goal instead is to defeat
the U.S.-led sanctions policy and to only engage the U.S. private
sector (American energy companies, in particular). For this purpose,
the apologists for the clerical regime have established well-funded
“nonprofit” entities within the United States to soften Washington’s
tough stance against the clerical establishment.
2. Led by the 50 million youth, the demand for reform in Iran
created President Khatami in 1997. In fact, the reform movement
was created by the mass demand for change. However, his inability
to deliver has broadened the mass discontent and accelerated the
implosion of the clerical regime. The historic election of 1997 was
a clear signal to the clerical establishment that Iranians want the
freedom to live and prosper without “divine intervention,” and that
they want an end to their country’s international isolation.
3. Despite official denunciations, a reservoir of goodwill toward
America exist among a majority of Iranians. The people of Iran
would welcome America’s principled, transparent and vocal
support of the movement for democracy and rule-of-law in their
country. Therefore, U.S. policy should not be held hostage to the
history of U.S.-Iranian relations and events surrounding 1953. As
far as a majority of freedom-loving Iranians are concerned, 1953 is
history. Washington must overcome this ingrained psychological
barrier, created in large measure by U.S. and Iranian academics of
the left and self-loathing businessmen and journalists dependent
upon Iranian visas and access (see section on U.S.-Iranian ties).
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4. Irrespective of who is President of Iran, the Islamic Republic’s
constitution specifically rejects popular sovereignty and puts
ultimate power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, un-elected by
the people and answerable only to “Allah.”
5. The popular overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran will send
a very powerful message to the entire Muslim world—Islam does
not solve the socio-economic problems that are at their root internal:
poverty and corruption, suppression, absence of democracy, and
economic opportunity.
Public Opinion in Iran.
In August of 2002, the Tarrance Group conducted a poll of
public opinion in Tehran. This research project― the first of its
kind―was designed to fulfill two main objectives: a) provide a broad
assessment of the social, economic, and political landscape of Iran;
and b) determine whether or not Iranians believe in a fundamental
change of the political system in Iran.
The findings from this survey validate stories that have recently
been reported by international news agencies about a growing level
of dissatisfaction within Iran towards the current regime. One finding
in particular best summarizes the current mood in Iran: 63 percent
of respondents believe that freedom and economic opportunity can
only come as a result of “a fundamental change” in Iran’s system
of government. Agreement with this viewpoint exceeds 50 percent
among every major demographic group and is highest among those
who rely on satellite television and the internet for information
about issues facing Iran (72 percent and 75 percent respectively).
Along the same line, 71 percent of respondents indicate that they
would support a national referendum that allows the people of Iran
to decide what system of government is best for the country. Once
again, this is something that transcends all demographic categories.
The mounting frustration within Iran’s citizenry can partially
be attributed to the facts that only one-in-three respondents (33
percent) feel that Khatami has delivered on his campaign promises,
and there is little expectation that things will change during his
remaining 3 years in office. While 29 percent of respondents say
64

Khatami is capable of bringing reform, a plurality (41 percent) of
Iranians believe that it is time for a new approach.
The maximum support the regime gets is between 15 to 19
percent. The cross tabs indicate that this level of support is from
respondents whose families have clerical ties.
In what comes as a rejection of the regime’s 23 years of hostility
against the exiled Iranian community, 72 percent of those surveyed
would welcome the involvement of Iranians living abroad in helping
to rebuild their homeland. Moreover, just one-in-four respondents
(25 percent) are of the opinion that history will judge the “founder of
modern Iran” unfavorably; a finding that essentially means that the
Pahlavi era is well regarded by many despite the regime’s attempt to
convince people otherwise.
In conclusion, the majority of Iranians living in Tehran want
to see fundamental changes in the way their country is governed.
People feel that the clerics have gone too far and overstepped their
traditional role, and that the country would be better served if they
were not directly in charge of the government. Part of the solution―as
supported by a decisive majority of survey respondents―is to hold
a “free, fair, and transparent national referendum,” allowing the
people of Iran to select the system of government that they desire.
History of U.S.-Iranian Relations.
Much of the policymaking community in Washington has held
back from making aggressive policy recommendations towards
the clerical regime. This is the result of a complete misreading of
the broad outlines of our country’s relations with Iran. The United
States has nothing to apologize for concerning its relations with Iran.
In fact, America’s timely interventions preserved Iran’s territorial
integrity and prevented that country from falling behind the “Iron
Curtain.”
President Bush should begin his assessment of U.S.-Iranian
policy with an objective look at the history of relations between
Washington and Tehran. By gaining a historical perspective on
U.S.-Iranian relations, President Bush would understand that while
officials of the Islamic regime have been lecturing America on what
Washington has done wrong, the United States was not always seen
as an enemy of Iran’s national interests.
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America’s first attempt at helping Iran was in 1911, when London
and St. Petersburg were manipulating the debt-ridden Qajar dynasty.
Morgan Shuster, an official of the U.S. Treasury Department, was
appointed financial advisor by the Iranian government to prevent
the strangling of an impoverished Iran by Britain and Russia.
Unfortunately, Britain and Russia succeeded in sabotaging his
mission.
In 1925, after a bloodless coup supported by the military,
Reza Shah Pahlavi assumed the throne and embarked on the
modernization of Iran with the help of American advisors. This
attempt to bring Iran into the 20th century ended with the onset of
World War II.
In 1941, Soviet troops reoccupied northern Iran, once again
threatening its sovereignty. From 1941 to 1946, the Soviet Union,
with the support of the KGB-infiltrated Iranian communist party,
began to dismember Iran by creating a second “Republic of
Azerbaijan” on the Iranian side of the border. When the war ended,
Soviet troops refused to leave northern Iran. Iran then appealed
to the United Nations, and America forcefully supported Iran’s
right to independence. Meanwhile, George Allen, then American
ambassador to Iran and an ardent supporter of its autonomy, was
arguing for more direct American assistance. The result was an
ultimatum from President Harry S Truman to Josef Stalin to get out
of Iran. The Soviets withdrew, and Iran was saved from disappearing
behind the Iron Curtain.
During his CNN debut, Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami
focused on the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadeq. Khatami charged that the ousting of Mossadeq and the
Shah’s return to power with Washington’s assistance was a major
contaminator of U.S.-Iranian relations. The truth is more complex.
Until 1953, the United States had supported Mossadeq, particularly
when Britain attempted to remove him because he was viewed as a
threat to British oil interests in Iran. By 1953, however, Mossadeq’s
policies had brought Iran to the brink of financial ruin. Iran’s
communist party―already strong among the industrial working
class, intellectuals, students, and army officers―further extended its
influence during this period. The Soviet flag and Stalin’s pictures
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appeared in the streets of Tehran. Concerns about the communist
threat to Iran forced America to act against Mossadeq’s increasingly
authoritarian tactics and in favor of the Shah. Once again, America’s
timely intervention―which, ironically, was supported by the clerics
at the time due to their dislike of atheistic communism―saved Iran
from falling under Soviet domination.
The one episode in this long history that stands out as a policy
mistake occurred in 1964, when the U.S. Department of Defense
pushed for, and got, full immunity from prosecution for all American
personnel stationed in Iran. Iranians, irrespective of their political
ideology, were outraged. This policy mistake gave an unknown
cleric named Ruhollah Khomeini a national issue on which to rise to
power: “They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than
that of a dog.” On November 4, 1964, Khomeini was exiled from Iran
for his remarks, and on the same day 15 years later, he sanctioned
the attack on the American embassy.
During the 1970s, Washington’s military alliance with Tehran
was a major deterrent to Saddam Hussein’s designs on Iran and the
Persian Gulf. This mutually beneficial alliance came to an abrupt
end with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its
rejection of so many things American. Emboldened by the sudden
disappearance of the Shah, Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. The people
of Iran paid dearly for their government’s anti-American policy―one
million died, and millions more were wounded.
The taking of 52 American diplomats hostage by Iranian students
in 1979 and the subsequent Algiers Agreement that ended this
hostage crisis in 1980, is used by some within the policymaking
community as a basis for refraining from adopting a policy of
regime change. The Algiers Agreement calls for “noninterference”
by Washington in the internal affairs of Iran. It is the opinion of
this writer that Iranian-sponsored acts of terrorism against the
United States overseas render this document’s clause pertaining to
“noninterference” as null and void. Furthermore, America’s national
security paradigm has changed significantly since the tragedy of
September 11, 2001. We cannot allow any rogue nation, including
Islamic Iran, to develop a nuclear bomb and blackmail and/or
threaten the United States and our allies in the region.
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With this long history in mind, the United States should not
invest its diplomatic and political energies in apologizing for recent
“past mistakes” in exchange for normalization of relations with
Tehran, or refrain from adopting a more robust policy towards those
responsible for the murder of Americans. Instead, Washington must
take the high moral ground and lend its unwavering support to
empowering the people of Iran for a regime change.
Implications of Regime Change.
The geopolitical and economic consequences of a regime change
in Iran and an end to that country’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb are as
follows.
•

The cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is the
uninterrupted exploration, development, and transportation
of oil and gas to international markets. A regime change in
Iran would significantly enhance this long-standing U.S.
policy.

•

Enhance the stability and security of Washington’s Persian
Gulf allies. Countries like Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait would breath easier knowing
that the geopolitical vacuum created by the fall of Saddam
Hussein would not be filled by Islamic Iran. Bahrain would
feel less threatened knowing that Islamic Iran would not
manipulate and encourage the Shi’a of Bahrain to challenge
King Hamad’s reforms. The Amir of Qatar would not have
to worry about a nuclear accident threatening the massive
liquified natural gas (LNG) infrastructure built to market
natural gas to markets worldwide. The United Arab Emirates
(UAE) might finally find a receptive government in Tehran
willing to compromise on the three disputed islands of Abu
Musa and the Bigger and Lesser Tombs.

•

Decouple Russia from its military, diplomatic, and geopolitical
ally in Tehran. The new Iranian government would have very
little justification for pursuing a relationship with the Russian
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Federation and, in fact, might view its relations with Russia
through a new competitive context; namely, competing with
Russia for pursuit of customers in the worldwide natural gas
markets.
•

The nascent government of Afghanistan would no longer
have to be concerned over Iranian adventurism within its
borders. This would increase the chances for stability and
economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. A Kabul-Tehran
axis defined by cooperation and alliance with the United
States could only enhance stability in that part of the world
and rout out remaining elements of al-Qaeda and Taliban.

•

Images of millions of Iranians marching through the streets
of Iran chanting “Death to the Islamic Republic” broadcast
across the Muslim world would be nothing less than a
historic earthquake of enormous proportion. The rejection of
Islam as a form of governance would impact Iran’s neighbors
Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq immediately.
The question that would be asked throughout the Muslim
world would be “Why, why have Iranians rejected Islam?”
Pakistan’s increasingly radicalized Islamic politics, Turkey’s
new Islamic Party, the Shi’a of Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s underground Islamic cells would
all be impacted.

•

Regime change in Iran would put an immediate end to
support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC). The new Iran would cut off all ties
to these terrorist organizations out of principle but more
importantly out of economic necessity. Iran’s meager
resources would be devoted to rebuilding Iran.

•

The first diplomatic act of a new, secular, and free Iran
would be to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Throwing Iran’s
diplomatic weight behind Israel would further isolate the
Arab world and its intransigence towards Israel.
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•

An Iran that is focused on developing its vast oil and gas
resources in the Persian Gulf would allow for a more rational
exploitation of the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources. A
pro-American Iran willing to act as a stable corridor would
add multiple pipeline options for the transport of Caspian Sea
oil and gas to international markets.

•

Beyond geopolitical considerations, President Bush should
indicate to the Iranian people that America is ready once
again to be Iran’s partner in prosperity. Both sides would have
much to gain. Iran’s more than 70 million people would once
again constitute a market for American goods and services.
American energy companies would have the chance to invest
in Iran’s vast hydrocarbon resources. In short, economic
engagement can lay the foundations for a return to normalcy
in U.S.-Iran relations.

What Needs to be Done.
Within Iran, the youth that make up a majority of the population,
journalists of reformist newspapers, clerics who question the
legitimacy of the Supreme Leader, and women who are at the
forefront of defying the ruling theocrats are Washington’s natural
allies. Engagement and collaboration between these groups and
America should be the cornerstone of U.S. policy towards Iran.
However, a fundamental problem facing U.S. policy towards
Iran is the lack of available resources to fund projects in support of
freedom and democracy in Iran. As a result, a significant vacuum
exists in U.S. policy towards Iran that is unfortunately being filled
by apologists for the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States.
The cost of empowering the Iranian people to change their regime
(over a 2-year timetable) should not exceed $200 million. (Note:
The Department of Defense (DoD) spends $3.6 billion/month
on operations in Iraq and $700 million/month on operations in
Afghanistan.)
Adequate funding of projects that are inline with the broader
U.S. policy objectives outlined by President Bush’s State of the Union
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Addresses can go a long way towards empowering the people of
Iran to affect change in their country.
The following are some funding options for review and
consideration by the U.S. DoD:
•

Short-term Funding:
o Produce and disseminate a civil disobedience training
video via satellite into Iran. This Farsi language video with
young men and women as instructors would highlight the
role of civil disobedience in toppling dictatorships. The
video would then be distributed throughout Iran.
o Hold a major conference on Iran at Georgetown University.
Very senior U.S. Government officials and leading Iranian
opposition figures would attend this conference. The
conference would be broadcast live into Iran with the
purpose of demonstrating to those inside Iran that the
disparate opposition is united in its demand for a regime
change. Images of a united opposition at a conference with
senior officials from the Bush Administration broadcast
live into Iran (and carried by all U.S. and non-U.S. outlets)
would be a major boost to the morale of those inside Iran
willing to confront the security forces of the regime. It
would also send a very powerful message to members of
the ruling clergy that their days may be numbered.
o Produce and disseminate educational videos in Farsi on
democracy in America to the Farsi-speaking media for
broadcast into Iran. A major component of this project
would be to highlight the positive role that American
women of Iranian descent are playing in the life of our
country. At this juncture in Iran’s history, it is very
important to highlight the failures of the regime and to
contrast this with the realities of life in America through
the lens of the American-Iranian community.
o Investigate, compile, and disseminate the human rights
abuses of the regime through visits by the victims of these
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human rights violations to Western capitals. In addition
to the fundamental differences with the Islamic regime on
such issues as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
terrorism, it is important that the issue of human rights
be a major focus of American demands for the Iranian
people.
o Invite senior and junior Shia clergy from Tehran, Qoma,
and Mashad to the United States for meetings with their
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim counterparts.
o Sponsor a trip for 30 Iranian journalists to take a tour called
“Get to Know America and Americans.” Let them then go
back to Iran asking this fundamental question: “Why do
Americans of Iranian descent living in the United States
enjoy a higher standard of living than Iranians in Iran?”
o Invite leaders of the student movement to testify on
Capitol Hill about their ordeal and how they envision
a future Iran. Giving these young men and women a
platform would provide enormous moral support to the
entire movement inside the country.
o Invite prominent Iranian women to meet with female
members of Congress, successful entrepreneurs, journalists, and nonprofit organizations like Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD).
o Immediately fund satellite TV stations based in Los Angeles
that are viewed by millions inside Iran. Integration of
these stations into a National Iranian Radio and Television
Network would provide an excellent platform for U.S.
officials to enunciate their vision for U.S.-Iranian relations
and for Iranian dissidents to share their vision of a future
Iran with their compatriots.
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•

Long-term Funding:
o Fund for 1 year the operating expenses of a U.S.-based
nonprofit foundation established to support democratic
principles, secularism, human rights, and a free market
economy in Iran. This 1-year funding would cover
personnel and major stand-alone projects. All the projects
outlined above could be rolled into the activities of this
U.S.-based nonprofit foundation.
o Provide funding to produce a comprehensive blueprint
for a post-theocratic Iran. This blueprint would cover
the future shape of Iran’s polity in the following areas:
constitution, foreign and national security, energy,
agriculture, health care, finance, commerce, role of
religion in society, and economics. The blueprint would
be disseminated into Iran through an aggressive media
campaign to demonstrate to the Iranian people, “A Vision
Of The Future Beyond An Islamic Republic.”

These major initiatives could be launched at a Rose Garden event
where President Bush announces via satellite to the Iranian people
(carried by Radio Farda, Voice of America, British Broadcasting
Corporation, Radio Israel, etc.) his firm commitment and dedication to
empowering the Iranian people to change their form of government.
Prominent members of the President’s own American-Iranian staff,
prominent and not-so-prominent members of the American-Iranian
community, and members of the Iran National Coalition would
be present at this event. This historic occasion would mark the
beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic of Iran and embolden
the Iranian people to rise.
Iranian Dissidents and a National Coalition.
One of the only prominent Iranian opposition figures outside Iran
publicly calling for an end to Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb is Reza
Pahlavi. In both his public and private speeches he has staked out
a position in line with U.S. concerns about regional instability as a
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result of nuclear proliferation. In addition, and according to various
press reports, his message of civil disobedience, nonviolence, and
national referendum are gaining momentum inside Iran, albeit at a
slow pace.
The rationale for supporting Reza Pahlavi and other dissidents
outside Iran (like Dr. Azar Nafisi, Dr. Manouchehr Gandji, Mehmat
Ali Chehregani, Sepehr Zanganeh, Ladan Boroumand, Mehangiz
Kar, Parviz Sayyad, Abbas Goli Bakhtiar, Esmail Khoee, and Hamid
Ladjevardi) is that there is a limit to how far one can criticize the
regime while inside Iran. It is only from the outside that one can
seriously question and challenge the regime. It is therefore imperative
that the United States encourage and support the activities of these
dissidents as symbols of opposition to the Islamic Regime. However,
the United States must not impose a solution that includes dissidents
like Reza Pahlavi. Rather, the United States must encourage the
formation of an Iranian National Coalition with Reza Pahlavi and
other dissidents as members of the coalition.
Critics of this approach will argue that this is a repeat of America’s
1953 debacle in Iran. This argument is far from accurate. The United
States would merely be leveling the playing field for Reza Pahlavi
and members of the Iranian National Coalition to put forward
their ideas as to how Iran’s future should be shaped. The Iranian
people would make the final decision in a free, fair, and transparent
referendum.
In order to ensure the success of Iranian dissidents and the
Iranian National Coalition, the following steps need to be taken:
1. Provide logistical support for the direct broadcast of dissidents’
messages into Iran.
2. Give more airtime to members of the Iranian National Coalition
on the VOA, Radio Farda, and other U.S.-based and non-U.S.-based
outlets.
3. Identify “safe houses” in the United States, Europe, and the
Middle East for members of the regime who wish to meet with Reza
Pahlavi and members of the coalition.
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4. Invite Reza Pahlavi and members of the coalition to Capitol
Hill to testify and share visions for Iran with the U.S. Congress.
5. Ask America’s allies in the Persian Gulf to fully fund the
activities of Reza Pahlavi and the Iranian National Coalition for a
2-year period.
Iran Coordinator.
The activities outlined above can be supervised under the
Office of Iran Coordinator. President Bush should appoint an
Iran Coordinator in order to ensure an outcome favorable to U.S.
interests in the post-theocratic Iran. The people of Iran are now
looking beyond the Islamic regime, and President Bush’s recent
statements since September 11 have emboldened them and inspired
the more courageous to publicly challenge that regime. An Iran
Coordinator is needed to ensure that President Bush’s intentions are
communicated to Iranians in an honest and unadulterated fashion.
The Iran Coordinator would also engage the people of Iran in a clear
and open dialogue about their future.
Further, the role of an Iran Coordinator would include providing
the administration with timely, pro-active policy initiatives designed
to ensure that the government of Iran does not sabotage U.S. efforts
in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The campaign to liberate Iraq from
Saddam Hussein dovetails with Washington’s goal of exporting
democracy to Iran. Any U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran must be
mutually reinforcing in order to achieve maximum benefits for U.S.
national security interests. Therefore, it would be important that the
Iran Coordinator explain America’s Iraq policy to the Iranian people
via the VOA, BBC, Radio Israel, Radio Free Iran and other satellite
stations based in Los Angeles.
Appointment of an Iran Coordinator would be one of the most
significant demonstrations of America’s resolve to establish relations
with the democratic and free Iran of the future. It would demonstrate
that the United States is serious when it says that it will support the
people of Iran in their quest for freedom and democracy. Indeed, the
Islamic regime could well begin to unravel immediately after this
appointment was announced because of the psychological effect on
75

the mind-set of all Iranians.
A fundamental feature of Iranian political culture has been the
“Green Light Syndrome.” In other words, the West in general, and
Washington in particular, decide the course of events in countries
like Iran. Therefore, if and when the time comes for one regime to
go or for a person to be supported, the United States will give the
Green Light, and it will happen. The majority of Iranians already
view President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech and his recent strong
statement in support of the people as a sign that Washington is ready
to give that “green light.” The appointment of an Iran coordinator
would be further “evidence” that the United States has given the
“green light” that the regime must go.
The Coordinator would report to the National Security Advisor
and attend all policy sessions on Iran. The purpose of the Iran
Coordinator would be to ensure that any regime change in Iran is
favorable to U.S. interests. The primary responsibility of the Iran
Coordinator would be to disseminate the administration’s policy
into Iran and to advise the administration of the Iranian response.
To this end, the Coordinator would vet opposition groups to ensure
that they share Washington’s national security interests and are
genuine democrats. Finally, maximum impact would be achieved
if the Iran Coordinator were fluent in Farsi and Azeri, understood
Iranian political culture, and was an American of Iranian descent.
Islamic Bomb versus Iranian Bomb.
A fundamental dynamic at play in Iran today is a renewed
sense of national pride at being Iranian. Islam, both as a religion
and form of governance, has taken a backseat to nationalism. The
historic struggle between traditionalism and modernity that has
been the mainstay of Iranian history is now swinging away from
traditionalism. Indeed, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was, in many
ways, a counter-revolution. After years of taking a backseat to
modernity, the forces of traditionalism had finally triumphed. In
many respects, Mohammad Khatami’s first victory in 1997, owed as
much to his use of nationalist themes and the inclusion of pride at
being Iranian as well as a Muslim nation.
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Viewed in this context, any announcement by the Islamic
Republic of Iran that Iran successfully detonated a nuclear bomb
would be welcomed by an overwhelming majority of the people.
This euphoria would be temporary but nonetheless widespread
because it would appeal to the Iranian sense of nationalism. Should
the regime make an announcement that the “nation has acquired an
Iranian bomb” then it would be welcome and legitimize the regime.
However, should the regime portray this event as an Islamic bomb
at the service of the Muslim world, then the entire context of what
this means to the nation would change. An “Islamic bomb” would
be viewed by the Iranians as a tool in the hands of the clergy to
intimidate and blackmail its neighbors. An Iranian bomb would be
viewed as a legitimate means to defend the nation against any real
or perceived enemy. It would be justified as: “Well, if the Pakistanis
have it, why not us. If the Israelis have it, why not us. If the Americans
have it, why not us.”
The Clerics and a Nuclear Bomb.
The 14 grand ayatollahs living in Iran would most likely support
and give their blessing to the continuation of Iran’s pursuit of
a nuclear bomb so long as it was put into the service of Islam; a
defense of Muslims and not used for offensive purposes. Of the 5,000
recognized ayatollahs in Iran, some might disagree with resources
being diverted to pursuing a nuclear option, but a majority would
be supportive. Those clerics opposed to the regime such as Grand
Ayatollah Montazeri would not welcome the news of a bomb in the
hands of the regime, but he would be supportive of the fact that the
“Muslim nation of Iran has acquired this capability.”
Junior clerics who have been vocal in their opposition to the
concept of velayate-faqih, such as Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah
Nouri, would in all likelihood support continuation of Iran’s quest
for a nuclear bomb. They would, however, lend their support so
long as the program was transparent, in order to ease the country
out of its current international isolation. They would, for example,
favor open access to all facilities.
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Nonclerics and a Nuclear Bomb.
The relatives of the powerful such as Mohammad-Reza Khatami;
Jamileh Kadivar, the wife of Ataollah Mohajerani, Khatami’s former
Minister of Islamic Guidance; Ali-Reza Nouri, the younger brother
of Abdollah Nouri; and Hadi Khamenei, the estranged brother of
the Supreme Leader, would also welcome Iran’s quest for a nuclear
bomb. This group, would, however, view this weapon in the broader
context of Iranian deterrence capabilities and not within the Islamic
context.
Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, the former mayor of Tehran, may
play a prominent role in the future of Iran and, as such, his position
on the issue of Iran’s quest for a nuclear bomb would be instructive.
As Tehran’s no-nonsense mayor, Karbaschi turned Tehran into a city
“that works.” His tenure as mayor and popularity during this period,
coupled with his still close ties to former President Rafsanjani,
suggests that he would pursue the nuclear option. He would see
this as a political platform for his own advancement, albeit using the
bomb itself in the context of defending Iran.
Any members of the regime’s revolutionary security forces that
emerged to take charge in a coup or regime change scenario would
most likely continue the quest for a nuclear bomb. They most likely
would see this as a positive platform and a nationalist agenda that
would play well with the majority of Iranians. Furthermore, as a
“military person” the issue would be put into the context of Iran’s
need to deter its “regional enemies” or stay at a parity with its
neighbors, Pakistan and India.
Conclusion.
The United States has a historic opportunity to put the genie of
Islamic fundamentalism back into the bottle by empowering the
Iranian people to change their regime. If Washington is serious
about ending Islamic Iran’s nuclear ambitions; if Washington is
serious about ending Islamic Iran’s support for global terrorism; if
Washington is serious about promoting democratic pluralism in the
Middle East; then a robust proactive policy of regime change is the
only option to consider. In the end, America must remain true to the
78

core values that have made our country a beacon of hope for millions
around the world: freedom, rule-of-law, and economic opportunity.
It is time we made it very clear to the Iranian people that we support
their quest for freedom and will act upon this quest, and that we will
not engage their tormentors in any way shape or form. Empowering
the people of Iran to change their regime is in America’s national
security interests; but it is also a long-standing tradition of our moral
fabric as a nation. The words of another President are instructive in
this regard:
Whenever the standard of freedom has been and shall be unfurled,
there will be America’s heart, her benediction and her prayers.
John Quincy Adams
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CHAPTER 5
WINNING IRANIAN HEARTS AND MINDS
Abbas William Samii*
Iran could become a nuclear capable state in the next 24-30 months
(June 2003-December 2005), in light of progress at Bushehr and other,
undeclared, facilities. The military option―from preemptive strikes
against nuclear facilities to a full-scale invasion―is one way to
preclude this eventuality. Many Iranians have a positive impression
of the United States and a dislike of their own regime, but it is very
unlikely that they would react positively to an American attack or to
an American-backed successor government.
Iranian attitudes towards the U.S. currently fall between two
extremes. Iran and its people can seem rabidly anti-American, with
a history of hostage takings and mobs continuing to chant “Death
to America” on a weekly basis. American visitors to the country,
however, report that such activities are almost pro forma by now, and
a 2002 opinion poll in Tehran found that almost three-quarters of
the population favors the resumption of direct Iran-U.S. talks. (The
United States broke relations with Iran on April 7, 1980.) At the same
time, visitors to Iran describe a proud and nationalistic people who
retain skepticism about U.S. motives, and opinion polls reflect this.
The United States could mitigate the impact of any military
action against Iran by persuading Iranians beforehand of its positive
intentions towards them, and this will take more than White
House declarations of support for the Iranian people. This chapter
recommends several concrete actions to win Iranians’ hearts and
minds. Washington should provide disaster relief to Iran, permit
enhanced international cooperation in Iranian counternarcotics
activities, assist Iranian HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
____________

*Dr. Samii is the Regional Analysis Coordinator for Southwest Asia at Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc. (RFE/RL). The views expressed here do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of RFE/RL.
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programs, and provide assistance to Iranian refugee support
activities. Washington also should encourage Iranian participation
in multilateral international fora and acknowledge Iran’s concerns
about regional developments, ease restrictions on Iranians’ ability to
visit the United States, and end its resistance to Iranian membership
in the World Trade Organization.
All of these actions would be pointless if Iranians are not aware
of them. Coupled with the concrete steps of the hearts and minds
campaign, therefore, must be an aggressive information operations
campaign that would counter Tehran’s anti-American propaganda
and disinformation. Accurate information about U.S. activities
should be relayed to Iran via FM and shortwave radio, satellite
television, and the Internet.
The policy recommendations in this chapter may not have a
serious short-term effect because most foreign-policy decisionmaking
in Iran is in the hands of a small elite. The impact of a hearts and
minds campaign would be much more significant in a decade, as
the 44.3 million Iranians who are under 30―roughly two-thirds of
the population of 66.4 million―and who did not participate in such
formative experiences as life under the pro-U.S. monarchy, activism
in the 1978-79 revolution, or fighting in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War,
come of age.1
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE GREAT SATAN
It is unrealistic to be very specific about the attitudes of a
population as large as Iran’s, but for many observers, a number of
images stand out―blindfolded American diplomats being led out of
the Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and a cleric toying with the remains
of an American serviceman killed in the April 1980 hostage rescue
mission, burning of the American flag at public events, and Friday
prayer congregations chanting “Death to America.” Then there is the
description of the United States as “the Great Satan.”2
The Satanic reference to the United States was more than just
a comparison to the Devil. It was an “important device in the
reeducation of the Iranian people to the new revolutionary ideology
of the Iranian state”―a lamentation that materialism had replaced
spiritualism and the assignment of blame to the United States.3 The
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Great Satan drew men from the path of righteousness towards sin.
The Iranian monarch, his family, and his entourage were corrupt,
but the United States was perceived as “the ultimate source of
that corruption.”4 Moreover, Iran-U.S. relations were marred by
misperceptions and misunderstanding.
The Great Satan terminology also reflected “outrage” directed
against the United States. A scholar explained:
The outrage felt by the Iranian people was heightened by the
knowledge, rarely admitted after the revolution, that many
Iranians were themselves largely to blame for Iran’s economic
and social difficulties during the years of Pahlavi rule.5

Some Iranians may chant against the Great Satan, but according
to visitors, the Iranian public does not share the anti-American
sentiments of its leadership. Journalist Elaine Sciolino developed
a set of rules to help her “survive the setbacks and embrace the
surprises of Iran,” and rule number 12 is, “Iranians Like Americans.”6
She notes that Iran officially sees America as its greatest enemy,
but at the same time, many Iranians see America as the Promised
Land. Sciolino cites the popularity of inexpensive pirated software,
CDs, and videos, the availability of knock-off Wrangler jeans in
Qom, and the way in which individuals who demonstrated against
America would ask her for help getting a visa. Throughout her book,
furthermore, Sciolino notes that she is generally received with great
warmth.
Two of Sciolino’s other rules, however, lead one to question this
warmth. One rule is, “Hospitality Doesn’t Mean Openness,” and
the other rule is, “Being Polite is Better than Telling the Truth.”7
These rules result in reservations about the depth of fondness for
Americans that Sciolino describes.
Journalist Afshin Molavi has written about Iranians and their
attitudes towards the United States, too. Molavi writes that as he
is sitting in a park with the Friday Prayer sermon blasting antiAmerican vituperative in the background, a group of young women
approaches him; one asks for help in completing a Green Card
application and another describes her application to an American
university.8 In another case, Molavi is watching a hard-liner rally

83

against the writers of an allegedly blasphemous play.9 The crowd
is led in cries of “The Playwrights Must Die,” “Reform Means
Blasphemy,” “Death to Israel,” and, of course, “Death to America.”
After the rally, however, one of the more enthusiastic chanters
approaches Molavi and asks, “How can I get a Green Card?”
Like Sciolino, Molavi recognizes that Iranians are sometimes
economical with the truth and may not be completely forthcoming
about their real feelings; in his words, “a remarkable ability to be
evasive, tell half-truths, and lie outright.”10 He describes this as a
survival mechanism. And the quest for Green Cards appears to be
associated with the quest for better economic opportunities and
greater social freedom. Indeed, many younger Iranians travel to
Damascus to get Canadian visas for these very reasons and because
American visas are relatively difficult to get.
Another American reporter who has traveled to Iran extensively
since the Islamic revolution, Robin Wright, also notes the dichotomy
of opinions towards the United States. In 1982 she encountered a
group of Revolutionary Guards who were looking for Americans;
when she reluctantly identified herself they wanted to know the
score of the Nebraska-Oklahoma football game.11 She also notes
that thousands of Iranians, including some top government officials,
were educated in the United States, and she describes the annual
reunion of the Islamic Association of U.S. and Canadian Graduates.12
Youthful participants at the annual rally to commemorate the seizure
of the U.S. Embassy are bused in, and one tells Wright that he sees it
as a day off from school, while many others say that if given a choice,
they would rather watch an American movie.13 At the same rally, a
young man asks Wright for help getting a visa to the United States.
Polls and surveys have been used in recent years to weigh public
opinion. Iran’s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance sponsored
a series of polls in 2001 that used innovative means to explore
Iranians’ sentiments on a range of issues (but not on attitudes towards
other countries).14 Some 16,274 people in 28 cities participated in the
polling, but it does not appear that such thoroughness is the norm.
The Ayandeh Research Institute and the Islamic Culture and
Guidance Ministry’s National Institute for Research Studies and
Opinion Polls conducted a survey in September 2002 which found
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that 74.7 percent of Tehran residents favored negotiations with the
United States, and 64.5 percent favored the resumption of Iran-U.S.
talks.15 Yet 70.4 percent of respondents said that the United States
is unreliable, 62 percent did not believe in Washington’s sincerity
in the anti-terrorism campaign, and 65.6 percent did not think that
Washington is sincere in its defense of freedom and democracy.
Two later surveys provided contradictory results. A late-March
2003 telephone poll of Tehran residents found that 84 percent of
respondents believe that Iran should continue its current policy of
neutrality and noncooperation with the United States.16 A survey
conducted 3 weeks later found that 83 percent of Tehran citizens
distrust the U.S. Government, and 85 percent of those polled think
of the United States as an “invading and colonial country.”17
This reversal in attitudes towards the United States can be
explained in several ways. The latter two surveys were conducted
when U.S. forces were participating in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(which started on March 20, 2003), and most Iranian newspapers
were not published from March 20-April 5, due to the Noruz (the
Iranian new year) holiday. During this period the only readily
available sources of information were Iranian radio and television,
which produced highly critical, biased, and inaccurate reports
about the war. Entekhab, Iran, Aftab-i Yazd, and Yas-i No newspapers
produced a few special issues during this period, but these, too,
were generally critical of the war effort and played up the negative
aspects of the conflict. Although the survey results were made
available, furthermore, information on the sample size or survey
technique was not reported.
There are questions about the September 2002 survey, too.
During the pollsters’ trial, the public prosecutor charged some of the
defendants with forging the poll’s results, completing questionnaires
without questioning anybody, not actually visiting some of the
addresses that they listed, and sometimes listing addresses that did
not exist.18 Needless to say, being charged with a crime does not
make a person guilty, nor can one view the trial relating to the poll
as much more than a political event.
Iranians are friendly towards Americans and favorably inclined
towards the United States, but they are also nationalistic and favor
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their independence. These sentiments are to some extent rooted
in the country’s history of encounters with foreign invaders and
neo-colonialists. Therefore, President George W. Bush’s inclusion
of Iran in his January 2002 “axis of evil” reference was insulting to
many Iranians, although the Iranian legislature later questioned the
Defense Minister about activities that contributed to this statement.
“Iranians’ fierce nationalism is characterized by intense suspicion
and outright resentment of outside influences,” a former Iranian
official writes, and he warns, “any U.S. strategy that even remotely
raises the specter of foreign interference in Iran is doomed to fail.”19
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States can enact several measures that would build
on the pre-existing positive sentiments described above. The ones
listed below would have negligible costs for the United States. These
policy recommendations could be enacted immediately, but it would
take some time for them to have an impact.
Disaster Relief.
The United States should continue to provide disaster relief for
Iran. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in
March 1997 provided $25,000 to the International Federation of the
Red Cross to assist victims of Ardabil Province earthquakes that
killed almost 1,000 people, injured 2,600, and left more than 60,000
people homeless.20
The United States also provided assistance in May 1997 after an
earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale caused devastation
in Khorasan Province. In June 2002 an earthquake measuring 6.3 on
the Richter scale killed more than 230 people, injured another 1,300,
and left an estimated 25,000 people homeless. USAID sent $350,000
worth of humanitarian aid (water containers, water purification
systems, blankets, and personal hygiene kits) to Iran via a chartered
aircraft, and provided another $50,000 to International Federation of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to provide blankets to the
victims.21
Iran’s Sistan va Baluchistan Province is badly affected by
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drought, and the main source of water there is the Helmand River,
which originates in Afghanistan. The Taliban essentially blocked
the river’s flow into Iran, and, although the situation improved in
Autumn 2002 due the improved relationship between Tehran and
Kabul, Iranians continue to bemoan the relative scarcity of water.
The United States could encourage Kabul to be more generous with
the river’s waters.
Counternarcotics Cooperation.22
Tehran claims that up to 2 million Iranians are addicted to or
abuse drugs, and drug-related convictions account for 40 percent of
the prison population. American nongovernmental organizations
already have provided assistance for addiction treatment and
counseling. Washington could underwrite such activities. Moreover,
club drugs such as ecstasy (MDMA) are becoming popular in Iran,
and the United States could share its experiences in dealing with this
new phenomenon.
Most of the drugs come from Afghanistan, the world’s largest
opium producer, and Tehran’s main way of dealing with this problem
is interdiction―static defenses, law enforcement, and military
measures. Tehran has promoted crop substitution in Afghanistan
and is providing counternarcotics training for its neighbors, and these
are areas in which Iran and the United States could cooperate. The
UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC, previously the UN Drug
Control Program) has an office in Tehran and is actively involved
with Iran’s Drug Control Headquarters. U.S. legislation (the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, see below), namely the requirement that the
United States reduce its contribution to an international program in
a proportionate share to its contribution to Iran, can and should be
waived in order to facilitate such cooperation.
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment.
The first case of AIDS in Iran was reported in 1987. Some 4,846
people in Iran have been diagnosed as HIV-positive as of mid-2003,
although there are unofficial estimates that up to 23,000 people
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in the country have AIDS.23 Iran’s problem with narcotics is the
main reason for the prevalence of the virus, with the sharing of
contaminated needles, especially in prisons, accounting for 65
percent of the cases. So far, the main Iranian solution to this problem
has been to separate addicted prisoners from those who are jailed for
narcotics offenses.24
Iran’s wider approach focuses mainly on prevention through
the provision of information and educational materials to patients
and the community; voluntary testing and counseling; serological
and behavioral surveillance; and HIV care, support, and treatment.
Moreover, related medicine is distributed free of charge. The World
Health Organization (WHO) provides support to the Iranian
Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education’s program to
control HIV/AIDS. This program includes blood screening, health
promotion and education, training workshops; and developing local
capacities, expertise, and awareness among public health workers.
Washington could facilitate public health professionals’ travel to
Iran to participate in intellectual exchanges, and it could make more
money available for the WHO activities.
Refugee Assistance.
Iran currently hosts some 2.55 million refugees―2,355,000
Afghans, 203,000 Iraqis, and 5,522 others. The government, which
is facing an estimated 25 percent unemployment rate, has enacted
a number of policies to encourage the refugees to go home because
they supposedly take jobs that would otherwise go to Iranians,
they consume social services, and they supposedly contribute to
the crime rate. These measures include forcible repatriation, the
withdrawal of services (ex: children’s education, health care), and
the refusal to permit Afghan husbands of Iranian women to stay in
Iran. Employers who hire refugees who do not have a work permit
face heavy fines.
The United States could provide assistance to Iranian refugee
support activities through the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). Not only would this help the refugees, but
also it would ease the pressure on the Transitional Administration
of Afghanistan and on the fledgling Iraqi leadership. Indeed, in 2000
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the United States provided the UNHCR with $7.4 million to support
its activities on behalf of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and
it provided a nongovernmental organization called the International
Rescue Committee with $905,349 to assist repatriation of Afghan
refugees from Iran and Pakistan.
Multilateral Dialogue.
The encouragement of Iranian participation in multilateral
international fora and acknowledgement of Iranian concerns in
bilateral meetings has taken place before and should continue. The
most recent example is the meeting of American and Iranian officials
to discuss the war in Iraq.25 Tehran has been praised for its role in the
November 2001 meeting in Bonn, Switzerland, about Afghanistan,
and it was seen as an important participant in the UN’s 6+2
grouping (Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors, the United States,
and Russia).
Iran first offered to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-1993. The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is chaired
by France, the United States, and Russia and is spearheading
the peace process, suggested in early 2001 that Tehran should be
informed of progress. As a French diplomat explained:
[Our aim is] to keep the Iranian authorities informed and to make
it clear to them that no one will be kept aside. We certainly do
not want to give the impression that we are acting against the
interests of one or another country in the region. There cannot be
a stable and long-lasting peace if it is not endorsed by all regional
countries.26

A similarly inclusive approach in other regional fora, such as the
Gulf Cooperation Council, would demonstrate an interest in and
consideration towards Iranian concerns.
Visa Regulations and Travel Restrictions.
The treatment of Iranian visitors to the United States should be
modified in some way. Greater concern about homeland security in
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the post-September 11, 2001, environment is normal and acceptable,
but the Iranian regime plays up the difficulties Iranians encounter in
getting visas and in actually trying to enter the United States.
A group of senior clerics associated with Ayatollah Mohammad
Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi accepted an invitation to participate in a
December 1999 conference at Georgetown University but withdrew
when immigration officials at John F. Kennedy Airport in New
York tried to fingerprint and photograph them. Iranian filmmaker
Jafar Panahi, who was detained at John F. Kennedy Airport in April
2001 for not having a transit visa, complained publicly that he was
mistreated and chained like a medieval prisoner. In February 2000 an
Iranian wrestling team complained bitterly about the fingerprinting,
and in May 2001 it boasted about the absence of fingerprinting.
A U.S. consular presence in Iran, which has not existed since
1979, would facilitate the visa application process and possibly
reduce such events. The United States should continue to push for
this, although it seems unlikely. In November 1999, Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Husseini Khamenei explained that
Tehran rejected such a proposal because “they [the Americans] want
to open an intelligence-political site in Tehran to make contact with
sold-out elements.”27 In January 2000 the director of the Kish Free
Trade Zone said that a U.S. application to open a consulate there
would be viewed favorably, but the Foreign Minister countered by
saying, “we have a clear position towards the United States. We
have no relations with the United States to talk about the opening of
a U.S. consulate in any part of the country.”28
World Trade Organization (WTO) Membership.
Iran first sought WTO membership in 1996, and in July 2001 the
White House declared that its opposition to Iranian membership is
“under review.” WTO decisionmaking is based on consensus, and
the United States has blocked Iran’s application consistently (most
recently in February 2002).29 Other countries, such as France and the
European Union, reportedly support Iranian membership, while
the German Economics Minister pointed out that a normalization
of ties with the United States would have to precede a successful
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membership application.30
There is domestic opposition to Iranian WTO membership, too.
Unions have protested against membership on the grounds that it
would lead to job losses.31 Opposition also comes from leftists who
favor a state-run economy, hardline isolationists, and conservative
traditional merchants who want to maintain import controls because
they have favorable licensing arrangements. A Ministry of Science,
Research, and Technology official accused “unnamed parties” of
blocking the country’s WTO application.32 The head of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) also has noted
that certain organizations, which he refused to identify, oppose
joining the WTO because removal of tariff barriers and subsidies
would eliminate their advantage.33
Iranian officials normally blame the United States regarding the
WTO issue. Washington would eliminate this grievance by allowing
Iranian membership. Just as importantly the role of the state in the
economy would be reduced and privatization would progress.
Iranian economic interaction with the rest of the world would
increase, and as Iranians recognize this interdependence they would
have a greater interest in reducing actions that alienate the country
from the international community.
POLICY CONSTRAINTS: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE LAW
Any initiatives will require awareness of U.S. policy towards Iran,
which was spelled out in several statements from the White House.
President George W. Bush in a January 2002 statement specified a
desired change in Iranian behavior.34
Well, first of all, Iran must be a contributor in the war against
terror; that our nation and our fight against terror will uphold the
doctrine, either you’re with us or against us; and any nation that
thwarts our ability to rout terror out where it exists will be held to
account, one way or the other.

As Iranian students held demonstration in July 2002, President
Bush specified another aspect of U.S. policy on Iran.35 “The people
of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities
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as people around the world,” he said. “Their government should
listen to their hopes.” The President added, “As Iran’s people move
towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they
will have no better friend than the United States of America.”
“The United States wants to see a democratic and prosperous Iran,
integrated into the global economy,” a top National Security Council
(NSC) official said in an August 2002 speech.36 He said that U.S. policy
towards Iran follows two tracks, one of which publicly identifies the
unacceptable aspects of Iranian behavior―”sponsorship of terror,
pursuit of WMD, and repression of the clearly expressed desires of
the Iranian people for freedom and democracy.” The other track lays
out a vision of partnership and support for the Iranian people.
U.S. policy is not about imposing change on Iran, but it will
support Iranians’ quest for self-determination, the NSC official
said.37 Nor is U.S. policy about factions or individuals in the Iranian
governmental apparatus.
U.S. policy is . . . about supporting those who want freedom,
human rights, democracy, and economic and educational
opportunity for themselves and their fellow countrymen and
women.

In addition to White House policies, several laws and regulations
impose restrictions and limits on possible initiatives regarding Iran.
Only one of these laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public
Law 87-195), is relevant to the policy recommendations discussed
above.38 This act bans U.S. foreign assistance to governments
supporting international terrorism, and the State Department has
identified Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since January 1984.39
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that
Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism cannot benefit from U.S.
contributions to international organizations. The United States
would reduce its contribution to the international program in a
proportionate share. This means that U.S. contributions to the
UNODC are reduced in proportion to UNODC contributions to
Iranian counternarcotics activities. U.S. contributions to UNICEF
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are exempt
from this restriction, and this provision does not apply to disaster
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relief aid. Section 620A permits the President to waive the restrictions
if this is in the national interest.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
The recommendations in the previous section could have
an impact on Iran at the grass-roots level and especially among
people who have had little prior interaction with Americans. The
recommendations will not be very effective, however, if the Iranian
public does not know that the United States is responsible. For
example, the earthquake assistance that the United States provided
in 2002 was delivered by chartered aircraft and by non-U.S. crews.
And if Iran does gain WTO membership, Tehran will almost certainly
claim that this is a diplomatic victory for it and another reflection of
failed U.S. efforts to isolate it.
Getting this information to the Iranian public will not be easy due
to serious media restrictions. The official Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting (IRIB) runs all the radio and television stations, and its
hard-line bias often is criticized by Iranians themselves.
Foreign radio stations that broadcast in the Persian language
are very popular in Iran, because they provide relatively unbiased
news about international events, offer a platform for Iranians who
do not have access to state media, and in one case, carry entertaining
programs. Among these foreign stations are the British Broadcasting
Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio France International, Kol
Yisrael, Radio Beijing, NHK Radio Japan, Voice of America, and
Voice of Russia.
The U.S.-sponsored Radio Farda began broadcasting to Iran
in December 2002, having replaced the 4-year-old Persian Service
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Radio Farda is on the air 24
hours a day and is available via FM, shortwave, and satellite signal.
Its target audience is the under-30 population, so it broadcasts pop
music to attract these listeners. It also has 15-minute newscasts at
the top of the hour 20 times a day and 3-minute newscasts at the
half-hour 20 times a day. Four times a day it transmits 30-minute
newsmagazines.
Satellite television is popular. The impact of Los Angeles-based
stations that are run by Iranian expatriates, such as Pars TV and
93

NITV, was demonstrated in the week starting October 21, 2001,
when NITV urged Iranians to take to the streets to protest against
the government. Iranians actually did so, rioting after losing a
World Cup soccer qualifying match. They chanted slogans against
the government and destroyed property. During several days of
demonstrations in Tehran in June 2003, satellite broadcasts again
urged Iranians to take to the streets and to confront the regime’s
security forces.
Not only is satellite television popular, it is illegal.40 There are
periodic police sweeps in which satellite dishes are confiscated, and
at the end of April 2003 President Hojatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad
Khatami-Ardakani and Speaker of Parliament Hojatoleslam Mehdi
Karrubi complained about unauthorized jamming of satellite
television signals.41 Reporters Without Borders noted the jamming
of foreign television and radio signals in June 2003.42 As satellite
receiving equipment becomes smaller and less expensive, it will
become more readily available to the Iranian public, thereby making
it easier to communicate directly with the Iranian people.
The Iranian print media also operates under numerous
restrictions, the most onerous being the undefined “red-lines,”
the crossing of which often leads to a publication’s closure.43 The
courts have closed approximately 80 publications since April 2000,
and Reporters Without Borders refers to Iran as “the biggest jail for
journalists in the Middle East” in its annual report for 2002.44
One of the means by which Iranians are overcoming the state’s
attempt to monopolize information sources is by turning to the
Internet. Persian language websites (for example, www.rooznegar.com,
www.emrooz.org, www.alliran.net), as well as foreign news sources,
are increasingly popular with Iranians. Iranians also exchange
information in chat rooms and blogs. The Minister of Post, Telegraph,
and Telephone estimated that 15 million Iranians would have access
to the Internet by March 2005.45 The Internet, therefore, is another
way to publicize U.S. initiatives.
Constant monitoring of Iranian media, interviews with Iranians
living in the United States, and traveler surveys would provide the
necessary input on the effectiveness of the recommended initiatives.
This, in turn, would facilitate making adjustments to those initiatives
that are having the desired effect, elimination of the ineffective ones,
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and adoption of new ones.
CONCLUSION
The United States cannot ignore Iran and hope that Tehran’s
attitudes will soften and its behavior change with time, because of
the threat it will pose in the near future. Iran is pursuing programs
to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, regardless
of its status in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).46 Most Intelligence
Community agencies believe that the United States will face an
ICBM threat from Iran by 2015, and Iran’s missile inventory already
is among the largest in the Middle East.47 Iran remained “the most
active state sponsor of terrorism during 2002,” according to the U.S.
State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism―2002 report,
providing support for violent groups such as Lebanese Hizballah,
Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
The policy recommendations described above are unlikely to
affect Iranian strategic thinking or its international behavior in the
short-term. But these steps will resonate with young Iranians who
were born after the revolution and who have become disenchanted
and frustrated with their country’s rulers. These individuals hope
for a better future, and a hearts and minds campaign will persuade
them that the United States is a friend that wants to help them
achieve that future. Such a campaign is, furthermore, in line with the
Bush administration’s policy of supporting the Iranian people.
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CHAPTER 6
U.S.-IRANIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION SINCE 1979
Geoffrey Kemp
U.S. attempts at strategic cooperation with Iran have evolved
through a number of stages since the traumatic revolution of 1979.
The first phase lasted through the 1980s and ended with the death
of Khomeini in 1989. The second phase witnessed the Gulf War and
the efforts by President Rafsanjani and, later, President Clinton to
establish some sort of modus vivendi. However it was accompanied
by harsher U.S. sanctions and strident anti-Israeli behavior and
rhetoric from Iran. The third phase began with the surprise election
of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and the new hopes for U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement. It ended with the fall of Saddam Hussein. The
current phase of the relationship will be dominated by postwar Iraq,
Iran’s continued support for terrorism and the advanced status of
Iran’s nuclear program. One way or another a climax to U.S.-Iranian
relations is likely in the coming year or so.
Phase 1: 1979-89.
The first years of the revolution were dominated by the 14-month
hostage crisis--November 1979-January 1981--precipitated when
Iran, in violation of international law, took American diplomats into
its custody in Tehran. Dramas of the hostage crisis had a profound
and dramatic impact on American public opinion and politics. It
was one of the key reasons President Carter lost the 1980 election
to Ronald Reagan. Two months earlier, Iran was invaded by Iraq
and the 8-year Iran-Iraq War began. Despite Saddam’s aggression,
the United States was quietly pleased to see the regime facing a new
major threat and while the United States professed neutrality, there
were expectations and hopes that Saddam’s forces would topple the
Ayatollah’s new government.
Thus when the Reagan administration assumed office in January
1981, it had no interest in modifying the tough line policy towards
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the Iranian regime, but as the war bogged down in Iran, the issue
was not on the front burner of the new administration.
It assumed much more importance in June 1982 when, against
expectations, the Iranian army successfully expelled Iraq from
Iran and then made the fateful decision to carry the war onto the
Arabian Peninsula, thereby threatening not only Iraq but also the
oil-rich Arab monarchies. This coincided with a period in Iran
when revolutionary zeal was at its peak and the hope of spreading
Islamic revolutions all around the region was openly talked about.
The problem was that the regime’s zealotry was not shared by most
of its neighbors, and Iran found itself isolated with the exception
of support from Syria and Shiite factions in Lebanon. The United
States concluded that a successful Iranian offensive against Iraq
would pose a major strategic threat to the region and therefore a
distinct “tilt” towards Iraq began. In other words, the first truly
strategic decision the United States made after the hostage crisis
was to oppose Iran in a forceful and effective way. Iran became
subjected to a widespread, worldwide embargo orchestrated by the
United States called Operation STAUNCH, while Iraq, on the other
hand, was openly supported by the majority of Arab states, Europe,
the Soviet Union and, more circumspectly, the United States.
At the beginning of the second Reagan administration, it was
clear that there would be no early end to the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s
lack of spare parts for its sophisticated U.S.-made Air Force was a
major constraint on its military operations, and the regime was losing
vast numbers of soldiers in suicide missions trying to breakthrough
the Shatt al-Arab barrier and take the city of Basra. It was the
extraordinary constraints on Iran’s Air Force and missile capabilities
that persuaded the Iranians to do the unthinkable--consider doing
business with the United States and Israel--by now known as the
Great Satan and Little Satan, respectively.
This was the beginning of the ill-fated Iran-Contra scandal
involving a deal to trade arms for American hostages held in
Lebanon by pro-Iranian groups, with the residuary benefit that
some of the money from the arms sales would go to the Nicaraguan
contras. The rationale for the willingness of the White House to
consider this overture to Iran, was based on a highly controversial
intelligence analysis that believed that there were moderate forces in
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revolutionary Iran who were prepared to compromise and reach a
rapprochement with the United States. It was argued that this would
be in American interests because of parallel concerns about growing
Soviet influence in Iran and the fear that Iran would ultimately fall
under Soviet hands, which would have significantly raised the
strategic risks to the United States in the Persian Gulf region. At that
time the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan was still in high gear.
While such an approach to Iran was bitterly contested by both
the Pentagon and the State Department, the arms-for-hostage deal
nevertheless proceeded and very nearly destroyed the second
Reagan administration. However, very few arms found their way to
Iran, but the United States increased its support for Iraq, especially
real time intelligence sharing. U.S. attitudes toward Iran became
increasingly feisty, and towards the end of the war the United States
became directly involved in the fighting as part of a multilateral
operation to protect Arab oil tankers that were being attacked by the
Iranians. On July 3, 1988, the U.S. warship Vincennes accidentally
shot down an Iranian airliner, killing 290 civilians. The end of the
war came soon after this event. Iran was a defeated power which
had been humiliated and isolated by the international community
and subject to the most brutal attacks by Saddam Hussein’s
forces which were using chemical weapons. At no time did the
international community protest beyond nominal utterances, and to
this day Iran’s sufferings and humiliation during this period are felt
by all Iranians, whether moderate, hard-liner, or anything else.
Phase 2: 1989-96.
The end of the Iran-Iraq War was followed a year later by the
death of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This opened the possibility of a
thaw in U.S.-Iranian relations. In his inaugural address on January
20, 1989, President George H. Bush appeared to reach out to Iran
when, in reference to the American hostages still held in Lebanon
by pro-Iranian groups, he said, “today there are Americans who are
held against their will in foreign lands, there are Americans who are
unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and will be long
remembered. Good will begets good will.”
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The Iranians read this as a signal that if they cooperated in getting
the release of the hostages, they would be rewarded in some way.
Most of the hostages were released. However, no rewards were
forthcoming. Iran remained a highly sensitive political issue for the
White House. George Bush, himself, had been tainted by the IranContra scandal and had no desire to follow in the steps of Carter and
Reagan and burn his fingers on overtures to this prickly regime.
Another opportunity for cooperation came during the 1990-91
Gulf War. Iran made a strategic decision to sit out the war and
mount no serious opposition to the American-led coalition. Iran
provided refuge for fleeing Iraqi airplanes and never turned them
over to the Saddam Hussein regime during or after the Gulf War.
From the Iranian point of view, they had made a strategic decision
to help the coalition by not interfering. They expected at the end of
war that there might be some gesture from the administration.
In a postwar speech, Bush offered four key challenges for the
new Middle East: to create shared security arrangements, to control
weapons of mass destruction, to promote a comprehensive ArabIsraeli peace and to promote economic development. These goals
became part of the cornerstone of the Madrid Peace Conference
which was convened in November 1991. Iran was not invited, not
consulted, and left out of the negotiations. It responded by hosting
a gathering of radical states opposed to the Madrid Conference. The
messages coming from Iran during this period remained mixed. The
new President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was considered more
pragmatic than Ayatollah Khomeini. However, it was not until the
Clinton administration came into office in 1992 that the Rafsanjani
government attempted any new initiatives, and this was not until
several years into the administration.
The Clinton administration came into office in January 1993, and
as is always the case, a reappraisal of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf
was undertaken. The administration criticized the Reagan-Bush
legacy arguing that the efforts prior to August 1990 to balance Iraq
against Iran and tilt towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War were
based on faulty thinking. The Clinton team did not believe that
a regional balance of power was sustainable. The United States
needed to treat both Iran and Iraq as “backlash or rogue” states that
should be contained and isolated.
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Clinton administration policy toward Iran can be broken down
into three periods. The first period, May 1993 to May 1995, saw the
enunciation of the “dual containment” strategy as an effort to keep
both Iran and Iraq impotent: the United States would become the
guarantor of Gulf security, act as the “balancer” in the region, and
deploy sufficient military power to deter, or if necessary defeat, both
Iraq and Iran in a future confrontation.
However, it was clear from the beginning that a differentiated
policy of containment toward the two countries would be pursued.
Iraq was subject to UN-mandated international sanctions resulting
from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. U.S.
policy was to eventually remove the Saddam Hussein regime. In
the case of Iran, U.S. policy was initially more benign, the focus
being to change key elements of Iranian policy, namely support for
international terrorism, rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process
(including Israel’s right to exist), development of weapons of mass
destruction, and violations of human rights and international law.
These objectives have remained consistent since 1993.
Meanwhile, Iranian President Rafsanjani sought to open Iran
to the outside world and to attract the foreign capital Iran needed
to rebuild after nearly a decade of war and revolution. A key part
of Rafsanjani’s new policy of openness was easing Iran’s tense
relationship with the United States. He believed that a more
open policy with Washington would facilitate Iran’s economic
development, particularly in the energy sector. Much of the National
Iranian Oil Company’s drilling equipment had been purchased in
the late 1970s and was badly in need of modernization.
Iran pursued Rafsanjani’s “moderate” foreign policy and sought
to reform the economy. Parts of the Iranian economy were liberalized
and opened to outside competition. In numerous interviews with
western media, Rafsanjani sought to downplay the years of enmity
with the United States and emphasized Iran’s newfound openness
to change. Iran also worked to improve relations with American’s
closest allies, especially Saudi Arabia and the European Union
(EU).
The United States pursued an ambiguous policy concerning
economic relations with Iran. While the official policy called for
“dual containment,” the reality was that the United States continued
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to trade with Iran, and U.S. oil companies continued to purchase
Iranian oil and sell it on the world market. Then, in 1995, came a
U.S. decision to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran and forbid U.S.
companies from doing business in the Islamic Republic. This was
a result of two converging pressures. First, the administration’s
efforts to convince Europeans and Japan that U.S. economic isolation
or containment of Iran was a good idea was offset by the reality that
the United States was Iran’s premier trading partner. Second, by
1995 anti-Iranian voices in the U.S. Congress had convinced the
administration that further economic sanctions on Iran would be
imposed the Congress. So the executive branch itself issued an
executive order banning further trade in May 1995.
Ironically, the catalyst of this decision was Iran’s surprise
announcement of an offer to an American company, Conoco, to
develop an Iranian off-shore gas field in the Persian Gulf at South
Pars. Conoco officials had worked for many years on the project
and beat out the French company, Total, for the contract. The
announcement sent shockwaves through Washington. Although
the agreement clearly violated the spirit of dual containment, senior
State Department officials were forced to admit that the deal was
legal. For their part, senior Iranian officials, such as President
Rafsanjani, may have hoped that the Conoco deal would help to
open a new period of U.S.-Iranian relations and to justify Tehran’s
foreign policy and economic reforms. Thus began a second, more
confrontational period of the Clinton administration’s policy toward
Iran which remained in place until May 1997.
During this second phase, the debate in Washington was
between hawks and superhawks. Few, if any, decisionmakers were
in favor of offering Iran an “olive branch.” The hawks were those
who wished to further isolate Iran economically, while trying to find
ways to cooperate with Europe in order to increase pressure on the
Iranian government to change its policies. The superhawks were
those who saw no possibility of negotiating with or moderating the
actions of the Iranian regime--what was necessary was a change of
regime.
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Phase 3: The Khatami Years.
The surprise election of Mohammad Khatami in May 1997
dramatically changed American attitudes towards Iran and ushered
in the third period of Clinton’s Iran policy. The election threw
the Clinton administration into something of a furor. Khatami’s
overtures to the United States following his election included
a remarkable interview with CNN Correspondent Christianne
Amanpour on January 7, 1998, where he called for a “dialogue of
civilizations” between the United States and Iran. Over the coming
months there was a flurry of activity suggesting that a breakthrough
in relations might be possible. In June 1998, Madeline Albright made
a speech at the Asia Society calling for a road map to better relations,
and President Clinton issued a statement at the time of the World
Cup soccer match between the United States and Iran, “as we cheer
today’s game between American and Iranian athletes, I hope it can
be another step towards ending the strains between our nations.”
The United States then made another strategic gesture to Iran
on October 8, 1999, by placing the premier opposition group to the
Iranian regime, the Mujahideen e-Khalq, on the terrorist list making
them susceptible to laws that freeze their financial assets in the United
States, deny U.S. visas to their families, and subject Americans who
assist them financially or with weaponry to 10 years in prison. This
gesture to the new Iranian leadership was reportedly due in part
to President Khatami’s decision to replace the former intelligence
Minister, Ali Fallahian, an architect of the terror campaigns, as well
as other controversial personnel in the old Iranian cabinet.
The Iranian direct response to these gestures was tepid and
did little to mollify the critics of Clinton who believed that he was
reaching out too far. The unresolved issue of the June 1996 Khobar
Towers terrorist bombing outside Dhahran still haunted U.S. officials,
as did the continued Iranian stridency towards Israel. Nevertheless,
the first four years of Khatami’s presidency were ones of high hopes
for better U.S.-Iranian relations. A lot of track two activity occurred
but no clear breakthroughs. During this period Iranians remained
bitterly divided on the wisdom of strategic cooperation with the
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United States and displayed very ambivalent behavior.
Khatami’s reelection in 2001 held out hopes that perhaps the
process could be restarted with the election of George W. Bush and
his Vice President, Dick Cheney. Cheney, as Chief Executive Officer
of Halliburton prior to joining the administration, had given several
speeches questioning the wisdom of continued sanctions against
Iran. The real opportunity came after September 11, 2001, and the
inevitability of a U.S. war in Afghanistan which would deeply affect
Iran. Iran feared the Taliban and quietly was delighted at their
overthrow. During that war, the Iranians did cooperate with the
United States and were helpful in efforts to form the interim Afghan
government at meetings in Bonn in December of that year. Again, it
was clear that those elements in the Iranian government interested
in better relations were using the Afghan war as an opportunity to
reach out. However, at the same time, more revolutionary elements
were increasing their strategic cooperation with terrorist groups
in the Middle East, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, and, ultimately, the Palestinian Authority. The discovery of
the Iranian arms heading for Palestine on the Karine-A merchant
ship, poisoned all hopes for rapprochement in the early days of
the Bush administration. In fact, it was following this incident that
Iran was placed on the “axis of evil” and clearly put in the sights
of America’s new policy on preemption. Iranian meddling in
Afghanistan after the war did not help their case either.
As it became clear in the summer and fall of 2002 that a crisis
with Iraq, in one form or another, was inevitable, U.S. officials met
secretly with Iranian counterparts to assure that, if there was a war
with Iraq, Iran would play the same role it did during the first Gulf
War. From what is known of the record, Iran’s behavior during
the Iraq War was relatively cooperative, but in the aftermath of the
war it is clear that the charges of Iranian intervention have to be
taken seriously. Again this reflects a bitter debate in Iran about the
wisdom of strategic rapprochement with the United States at this
time. Reformers, by and large, see the fall of Saddam Hussein as
an opportunity to open up to the administration, accept the reality
of American power in the region, and move on to resolve the
horrendous domestic problems they face. Alternatively, the hard-
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liners see the American threat as more ominous than ever. Iranian
strategic planners were not unhappy with the situation in Iraq prior
to Saddam’s fall. He was, after all, contained by the United States
and was placed under a strict international arms embargo. Iranians
now worry that a new, strong Iraq will emerge which will clearly
pose threats to them.
Phase 4: Future Prospects for Cooperation.
The coming months will be some of the most critical in U.S.Iranian relations. The dramatic news that became public in the latter
months of 2002 and confirmed in February 2003, that Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure was far more advanced than the public had been led to
believe, puts the possibility of the Iranian bomb front and center and
poses a most severe challenge to America. This, paralleled with the
uncertainty in Iraq, means that sooner or later some confrontation
with Iran over nuclear weapons, terrorism, and involvement in Iraq
is inevitable unless the Iranians choose this moment to walk away
from the Arab-Israeli conflict, reign in their terrorism, and find some
way to finesse their nuclear program within the confines of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
If Iran decides that the time has come for a political dialogue with
Washington, the most difficult task will be to persuade its leaders
that its security will be enhanced if it abandons terrorism and defers
a nuclear weapons program.
However, Iran will argue that it still lives in a nuclear
neighborhood. Israel, Pakistan, and India will be presented as
evidence of the nuclear asymmetries. So long as a dialogue focuses
on these regional discrepancies, little progress is likely. Israel will not
contemplate negotiating about its bomb until a generation of peace
between itself and its neighbors has passed. Likewise, Pakistan will
not forsake the bomb so long as India is perceived as a threat. India,
always concerned about China, will not abandon its bomb until the
United States, Russia, China, the U.K., and France do likewise. Thus,
it is quite unrealistic for Iran to expect a nuclear quid pro quo for
its own restraint. This is where carrots, as well as sticks, become
important. If Iran ends military and financial support to terrorist
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groups, signs the additional protocol of the NPT, and complies with
the statutes of the Chemical Weapons Convention, real progress
may be possible. The carrots could be considerable. The United
States could help resolve bilateral issues, including the return of
financial assets held since the revolution and the end of executive
and legislative trade sanctions. Under these circumstances the
United States should be prepared to work with Iran in developing
investment opportunities in the region, including energy projects.
If there is future regional cooperation, Iraq and Iran must
participate. However, much will depend on the configuration and
policies of a new Iraqi regime and how much residual control will
rest with the United States or UN occupation forces. Iran’s leaders
will be very suspicious of the United States and its role in postwar
Iraq, especially given the presence of a formidable U.S. military
force. To convince them that the United States seeks cooperative
security arrangements rather than coercive dominance will not be
easy, especially since the two key U.S. demands of Iran--abandon
terrorism and stop the nuclear weapons program--are linked in
Iranian eyes to their national security.
Iran faces tough political choices with regard to its U.S. policy,
but the Bush administration also needs to address Iran’s security
needs if terror is stopped and the bomb put on hold. It is unrealistic
to expect Iran to stop its missile program or slowdown the
modernization of its conventional forces absent a new cooperative
regional security environment. For it is not only weapons of mass
destruction that determine security priorities. The future of the U.S.
military presence in the Arab world and the size and configuration
of Iraq’s restructured armed forces will be key factors influencing
Iranian perceptions.
The coming months will be critical for U.S.-Iranian relations. The
dramatic news that became public in the latter months of 2002 and
was confirmed in February 2003, that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure
was far more advanced than the public had been led to believe, puts
the possibility of the Iranian bomb front and center and poses a most
severe challenge to the United States and to Middle East regional
security and the global non-proliferation regime. This development,
paralleled by the uncertainty over developments in Iraq, means that,
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sooner or later, some confrontation with Iran over nuclear weapons,
terrorism, and involvement in Iraq is inevitable unless the Iranians
choose to moderate their policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict,
reign in their support for terrorism, and find some way to finesse
their nuclear program within the confines of the NPT.
The advanced status of the Iranian nuclear program has been
revealed most explicitly in recent visits to the country by IAEA
inspectors. It will soon be known whether or not Iran will comply
with international pressures to sign the Additional Protocol to
provide more transparency about its nuclear activities. Even if Iran
takes this step, there will be many skeptics who will argue that such
action will merely delay the day when Iran can get the bomb. The
good news is that the international community, particularly the
Europeans, Russians, and Japanese, now seem to share American
concerns about what the Iranians are up to.
By early 2003, the Russians and the Europeans were becoming as
worried as the Americans about the Iranian nuclear program and,
while the war in Iraq set cooperation back a pace, there is no doubt
that the initiatives undertaken by the United States in probing the
IAEA to be more assertive towards Iran has been reciprocated in
Moscow and Brussels. This is a very positive development in view
of the laidback European attitudes of the past and the formerly
uncooperative behavior of Russia. It does suggest that by consistently
dwelling on the problems posed by an Iranian bomb, the U.S.
Government and U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have
had an influence on the thinking of key partners. Whether or not
this combination of pressure will affect the regime’s behavior is but
one element in the debate about how to handle this dangerous and
difficult problem. The other hope is that the Iranians themselves, as
a result of rational and careful debate, will come to see that nuclear
weapons do not serve their national interest even though they have
incentives, and to some extent, the right to develop a self-sufficient
nuclear energy program.
Thus, there may be a small window of time during which Iranian
opinion can be influenced towards restraint. This outcome is by no
means certain and will depend upon many contingencies, but it is
surely worth making a determined effort to have constructive input
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into the Iranian debate. It is interesting to note that on another issue
of importance to Iran, namely its policy towards Israel, the Iranian
Parliament has become more open to questioning the dogma of the
regime which has been to deny Israel’s right to exist and support
groups that advocate the use of force against Israel. Now a number
of senior Iranians, including members of Parliament, are asking the
very fundamental question: how does a policy of confrontation with
Israel serve Iranian national interests? Since this is one of the key
issues that bedevil U.S.-Iranian relations, it is a fair question. The
objective, therefore, of stimulating any debate in Iran about nuclear
weapons must be to have Iranians ask the same question: How
would the bomb serve our national interests?
If Iran continues to refuse to have a formal official dialogue
with the United States to discuss each country’s concerns, the
probabilities for dangerous encounters will increase. Iran will
not kowtow publicly to American demands, especially in view of
the difficulties the United States continues to face in postwar Iraq.
However if approached with a serious set of proposals, Iran’s leaders
might rethink their agenda. The United States should explore the
possibilities for better relations while continuing its message on
terrorism and WMD. If this opportunity is missed, the likelihood of
confrontation will increase and, at an indeterminate time, an Iranian
bomb will materialize.
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CHAPTER 7

THE CHALLENGES OF U.S. PREVENTIVE MILITARY ACTION
Michael Eisenstadt
For some U.S. policymakers and military planners, Israel’s 1981
raid on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor may serve as an object lesson
regarding the potential benefits of preventive military action against
Iran’s nuclear program. Not widely appreciated is how risky and
difficult the Osiraq raid was, and how the factors which ensured
its success make attempting similar action against Iran’s nuclear
facilities so challenging. U.S. preventive action against Iran’s nuclear
program would necessarily bear little resemblance to the Osiraq
raid, and the results would unlikely be as decisive and lasting.
The success of the Osiraq operation obscured difficulties in
planning and execution. The raid was the longest mission the Israeli
Air Force had undertaken at that time. The strike package (eight F16s escorted by six F-15s) flew nearly the entire 2,000 km mission over
hostile airspace, yet managed to achieve surprise. The F-16s were
operating very close to their maximum unrefueled combat radius;
had they been challenged by Jordanian, Saudi, or Iraqi aircraft, they
would have lacked endurance to engage in evasive maneuver or
sustained aerial combat. The raid on Osiraq pushed Israel’s air force
to the very limits of its operational capabilities.1
Several factors contributed to the Israeli success in 1981:
•

The Osiraq reactor―a highly visible and vulnerable target―
was the centerpiece of Iraq’s nuclear program, and its
destruction set the effort several years back.2 Learning from
this experience, Iraq subsequently dispersed and hid its
nuclear infrastructure. Other proliferators―including Iran―
have since done the same.3
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•

Israel may have benefited from French aid in destroying
Osiraq. French intelligence reportedly emplaced a homing
beacon at Osiraq to help Israeli pilots locate the facility or
target a critical underground structure there.4

•

For Israel, Iraq was an enemy state that was pledged to its
destruction. For Israeli cabinet members who voted in favor
of the raid, the imperative to eliminate a perceived existential
threat ultimately overshadowed countervailing political
considerations.

•

Iraq was at war with Iran at the time, and was thus constrained
in its ability to strike back against Israel. Retaliation eventually
took the form of an unsuccessful Iraqi attempt to strike the
Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona with missiles during the
1991 Gulf War.

Many of the conditions that were conducive to success at Osiraq,
however, do not apply to the case of U.S. preventive action against
Iran’s nuclear program. In particular:
•

Key elements of Iran’s nuclear program are dispersed and
concealed. Accordingly, it would not be possible to disable
Iran’s nuclear program by a single strike against a solitary
facility; multiple simultaneous strikes against several sites
would probably be required.

•

While foreign technicians and advisors have access to parts
of the declared civilian nuclear program (notably the Bushehr
power plant), facilities involved in any clandestine parallel
program are almost certainly off-limits to foreigners.

•

Though relations between Washington and Tehran are tense
and occasionally hostile, the United States is interested in
encouraging political change in Iran, and in improving
relations with that country. Preventive action might
complicate, if not undermine, these efforts.

114

•

Iran could respond to a preventive strike by retaliating against
U.S. interests in Iraq, the Persian Gulf region, or against the
United States itself, by means of Iranian agents or associated
terrorist groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah.

For these reasons, preventive action against Iran (whether covert
action involving U.S. intelligence assets or overt military action
by U.S. military forces) is a much more complicated proposition
than the Israeli strike on Osiraq. Significant intelligence and
targeting challenges would have to be overcome, the potential for a
nationalistic backlash in Iran and renewed tensions with U.S. allies
would have to be managed, and Iranian retaliation would have to be
deterred or disrupted.
Nonetheless, prevention must be given serious consideration for
a number of reason: it is unclear whether the diplomatic option that
the United States is now pursuing will bear fruit; solutions may be
found to the intelligence, targeting, political, and security challenges
of preventive action against Iran; and by keeping this option on the
table, the United States can use the threat of prevention as a spur to
multilateral diplomacy.
This chapter will thus assess the risks, challenges, and implications
of prevention, assuming that the potential consequences of a nuclear
Iran are sufficiently grave to justify consideration of such a potentially
perilous course of action. It will not, however, evaluate the risks of
not taking preventive action or the implications of a nuclear Iran for
U.S. interests, which is a necessary element of any net assessment of
the pros and cons of preventive action, but beyond the scope of this
chapter.5
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: A HARD TARGET
Bushehr: Part of the Nuclear Target Set.
Iran’s nuclear program has made steady progress. The power
plant at Bushehr is finally approaching completion. According
to Russian officials, Unit I at Bushehr may be completed by late
2003 or early 2004, with the first consignment of reactor fuel to be
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delivered during this timeframe.6 Problems have dogged Iran’s
nuclear program from its inception. Russia originally undertook to
complete Unit I by 1999, though technical and financial problems
caused repeated delays. It is conceivable that new technical snafus, a
Russian decision to hold-up the shipment of reactor components or
fuel, or teething problems during reactor startup, could further delay
completion of the project. Iranian officials have indicated, however,
that the successful completion of Unit I might lead to contracts for
additional nuclear power plants at Bushehr and Ahvaz, providing a
powerful incentive for continued Russian cooperation.
Bushehr provides Iran with two potential routes to “the Bomb”:
low-enriched uranium fuel earmarked for Bushehr could be diverted
and further enriched to weapons-grade material, or the reactor could
be used to produce plutonium for weapons use.
Though not ideally suited for the purpose, Bushehr could
produce enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons per year.
If Tehran were willing to violate its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) commitments or withdraw from the NPT, Iran could separate
truly prodigious quantities (scores of bombs worth) of weapons- or
reactor-grade plutonium annually―depending on fuel burn-up.
Although reactor-grade plutonium is not ideal for bombmaking
(Heat and radioactivity makes it difficult and dangerous to work
with, while its isotopic composition makes for an inefficient and
unreliable bomb in rather crude weapons designs.), the United
States demonstrated the military utility of reactor-grade plutonium
in a 1962 underground nuclear explosive test.7 Assuming that
the Bushehr reactor comes on line in early 2004, Iran could start
producing spent fuel containing plutonium by some time in 2005.
Separation of plutonium from spent fuel and weaponization could
take several months more, provided that Iran had the requisite
know-how. Thus, Iran could conceivably produce a bomb using
plutonium from Bushehr within three or four years.
Clandestine Fissile Material Production: Dispersed, Hardened,
Hidden?
In response to detailed allegations by an expatriate Iranian
opposition group, Iran has acknowledged that it is building a heavy116

water production plant and plans to build a 40MWt natural uranium
research reactor at Arak, and that it is constructing a gas-centrifuge
plant at Natanz. The existence of these facilities, confirmed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a June 2003 report
to its Board of Governors,8 and Iran’s prior failure to declare their
existence, raises the troubling question of whether these facilities
were formerly intended to be core elements of a clandestine weapons
program.
Little is known about the natural uranium reactor that Iran plans
to build at Arak, but Iranian officials have indicated that it will be
a CANDU-type design intended for research purposes. 9 A typical
40MWt research reactor could produce sufficient plutonium for a
few weapons a year. Construction of such a reactor usually takes 5-7
years, so it will be some time before this reactor becomes a factor in
Iran’s proliferation calculus.
The Iranian centrifuge program reportedly benefited from
Pakistani help in the early 1990s (and perhaps more recently) and
North Korean help in the late 1990s, and appears to have made
steady progress.10 Iran is currently building a uranium conversion
facility at Esfahan to produce uranium hexafluoride feed-stock
for its centrifuge program; Iranian officials claim that the plant is
nearly ready to start operation. Moreover, a February 2003 IAEA
visit revealed that Iran is producing gas centrifuges. (If it tested
these using uranium hexafluoride gas before commencing mass
production―and it seems implausible that it would not have done
so―it may have already broken its NPT commitments.) A visit to a
facility at Natanz found a small pilot cascade of 160 centrifuges and
parts for 1,000 more, in a facility large enough to accommodate 50,000
centrifuges. The discovery of Natanz has raised questions about the
possible existence of clandestine centrifuge cascades elsewhere in
Iran.
More recently, the National Council for Resistance―the Iranian
opposition group that first revealed the existence of nuclear facilities
at Arak and Natanz in August 2002―has claimed that such a pilot
plant is located at Kalahdouz (about 14km west of Tehran) and that
Iran is building a fuel-fabrication facility at Ardekan (about 30km
northwest of Yazd, in central Iran)―presumably to service the fuel
requirements of the Bushehr reactor.11
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In sum, Iran appears well on the way to attaining all of the
elements needed to produce large quantities of fissile material by
either the plutonium or uranium-enrichment routes. Assuming
all goes right for Iran, it could produce its first nuclear weapon
within three or four years. The window of opportunity for effective
preventive action may well be better measured in months than in
years.
North Korea: An Alternative Source of Fissile Material?
Over the past 2 decades, Iran has emerged as the premier
customer for North Korean arms, missiles, and, more recently,
nuclear technology. Were North Korea to reprocess its declared stock
of spent fuel (it appears to have started doing so already), it could
separate enough plutonium within a matter of months for five to six
nuclear weapons. Pyongyang might then opt to export some of that
plutonium. Were North Korea to continue its uranium enrichment
program, resume operation of its existing reactor, and complete
work on two unfinished reactors, it could be producing enough
fissile material within 5 years for up to 50 nuclear weapons per
year.12 Based on its record, there is reason to believe that Pyongyang
might be willing to sell fissile material and weapon design data to
proliferators in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, North Korea
offers an alternative, nonindigenous route for the acquisition of
fissile material by Iran.
THE CHALLENGES OF PREVENTION
Preventive action cannot stop a determined proliferator as far
along as is Iran, though it could substantially delay Iran’s nuclear
progress. The principal goal of U.S. action would be to delay Iran’s
nuclear program long enough to allow for the possible emergence of
new leadership in Tehran willing to either eschew nuclear weapons,
freeze its nuclear program short of the production of fissile material,
or act responsibly, should it acquire nuclear weapons.
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Intelligence Challenges.
The United States could pay a high price for preventive action,
including an anti-American nationalist backlash in Iran, damage to
its international standing, and the death of U.S. citizens targeted by
Iranian retaliation. Accordingly, U.S. decisionmakers will have to
feel reasonably confident that preventive action will significantly
delay Iran’s acquisition of its first nuclear weapon by a number of
years, before they could countenance such a course of action. Simply
imposing human or material costs or causing modest delays will―
under most circumstances―not likely be considered a sufficiently
large payoff to justify the possible risks and costs involved.
Such a cost/benefit calculus will translate to exacting
requirements for detailed, accurate, and complete intelligence
regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Here, the U.S. track record is
not particularly encouraging; for years, Iraq, North Korea, and
most recently Iran, successfully hid large parts of their nuclear
programs from the United States. Significant intelligence gaps
concerning Iran’s nuclear program may remain. The fact, however,
that sensitive information about Iran’s nuclear program is finding
its way to expatriate Iranian opposition groups indicates that there
may be “leakers” in the program who might be willing to provide
sensitive information to foreign intelligence services. The possibility
that the United States could obtain actionable intelligence regarding
Iran’s nuclear program should not be ruled out.
Technical Challenges.
The technical processes related to fissile material production
create both vulnerabilities and challenges. Plutonium programs
may be vulnerable to interdiction due to their reliance on large
reactors that produce significant signatures―though it may be
possible to locate a plutonium production reactor underground to
reduce prospects for detection and destruction.13 Destroying the
reactor at Bushehr or the one planned for Arak might set back Iran’s
plutonium program several years, provided Iran is not building or
operating a clandestine plutonium production reactor elsewhere.
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While it would be preferable to target these prior to start-up to
avoid exposing civilians downwind to fallout, there may be ways
to disrupt operations or destroy the reactors after start-up without
releasing radioactive material into the environment and creating a
downwind hazard.
Centrifuge programs pose a more complex set of challenges.
A large number of workshops and factories may be involved in
producing and assembling centrifuges, and they can be widely
dispersed and easily hidden. Centrifuge cascades have relatively
low electrical power requirements (a tell-tale signature of other
enrichment technologies), and can be housed in small, dispersed,
nondescript facilities which would be difficult to detect by means
of remote sensors, as well as in huge plants―such as the one at
Natanz.14 If preventive action is to have a long-term impact, both
centrifuge component production and gas centrifuge enrichment
facilities would have to be destroyed, which may not be practically
possible. The uranium conversion plant under construction at
Esfahan is also a likely target. Destroying it could set back Iran’s
centrifuge program several years―provided Iran does not possess a
pilot plant or duplicate facility elsewhere.
Political Challenges.
There seems to be broad support across political factions in Iran
for the government’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.15 Thus,
should the United States act preventively, it must do so in a way
that ensures that such action does not poison the reservoir of proAmerican goodwill among young Iranians or derail the movement
for political reform, thereby complicating efforts to encourage
political change and improve U.S.-Iranian relations. In political
terms, overt U.S. military action would entail the greatest risk. For
this reason, the United States might first consider other options, such
as preventive action by allies, or covert action on its own.
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OPTIONS FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION: ALLIED, COVERT, OR
OVERT?
Allied (Israeli) Military Action.
Other than Israel, few, if any, U.S. allies would be willing or able
to carry out such an operation. However, Iran’s leaders (and many
others in Iran and elsewhere) would tend to see an American hand
behind an Israeli military operation, and Iran might be tempted to
strike back in ways that would harm both Israel and the United
States (e.g., by encouraging Palestinian or al-Qaida terrorism against
Israeli or American targets, or goading the Lebanese Hizballah―with
its thousands of katyusha rockets in southern Lebanon―to heat up
the border with Israel). Israel, however, might be willing to accept
these risks in order to deal with a perceived existential threat.
Covert U.S. Action.
Covert action would probably be the most politically expedient
way for the United States to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program. It might
include one or more of the following measures, including:
•

harassment or murder of key Iranian scientists or
technicians;

•

introduction of fatal design flaws into critical reactor,
centrifuge, or weapons components during their production,
to ensure catastrophic failure during use;

•

disruption or interdiction of key technology or material
transfers through sabotage or covert military actions on land,
in the air, or at sea;

•

sabotage of critical facilities by U.S. intelligence assets,
including third country nationals or Iranian agents with
access to key facilities;
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•

introduction of destructive viruses into Iranian computer
systems controlling the production of components or the
operation of facilities;

•

damage or destruction of critical facilities through sabotage
or direct action by U.S. special forces.

Some of these actions might have only a modest effect on Iran’s
nuclear effort; others might have a significant impact. Covert
action could, however, reduce the risks of a political backlash and
retaliation―since it might not be possible for Iranian authorities to
determine, for instance, whether the death of a scientist was due to
natural or unnatural causes, or whether damage to a critical facility
was due to an industrial accident or sabotage.
For covert action to succeed, the United States would have to
disrupt both Iran’s plutonium and uranium-enrichment programs.
This might require a sustained covert campaign entailing various
actions―the assassination of key personnel, the recruitment of agents
or saboteurs at key facilities, the subversion of critical computer
networks, direct action operations against critical facilities, etc. Any
one of these actions would be difficult enough to pull off; conducting
a sustained campaign in which the United States maintained
plausible deniability would be even harder. For this reason, covert
action may have a role to play, but is unlikely to have a broad, longterm impact on Iran’s nuclear program.16
Overt U.S. Action.
Overt military action (e.g., cruise missile and/or air strikes) may
offer the best hope for success. For political and operational security
reasons, however, the United States would probably avoid staging
from facilities in friendly Arab states in the region. (And most Arab
states would probably prefer not to aid or abet such an operation, to
avoid becoming a target for Iranian retaliation.) U.S. decisionmakers
would probably prefer to go it alone, rather than approach regional
partners with requests for access, basing, or overflight privileges that
would likely yield only marginal military benefits, while possibly
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compromising the operation and straining relations with important
friends and allies.
Such a mission is likely to rely on naval platforms capable of
launching Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAMS) and
strike aircraft against targets in southern and central Iran, while Air
Force B-52s and B-2 stealth bombers operating from the continental
United States would likely be tasked to strike targets deep in Iran
(e.g., near Tehran). Range would not be a problem, and providing
they achieve surprise, U.S. forces would stand a good chance of
avoiding losses at the hands of Iranian air defenses. Nearly all fixed
wing fighter aircraft in the U.S. Naval and Air Force inventory can
deliver precision munitions, and the United States has a number
of conventional penetrator munitions (such as the GBU-28 laserguided bomb and the AGM-86D Conventional Air-Launched Cruise
Missile Block III) for use against hardened and/or buried facilities.
(The Natanz centrifuge facility will reportedly be hardened and
buried―protected by several meters of reinforced concrete and
buried some 75 feet underground when completed.)17 There are,
however, significant challenges associated with the targeting of
hardened, buried facilities.18
Overt action, however, is politically problematic. It could
prompt an anti-American backlash among formerly friendly
Iranians, strengthen the hand of hard-liners, and prompt the
regime to retaliate against U.S. interests in the Gulf or elsewhere.
For this reason, should overt military action be deemed necessary,
Washington would be wise to make a serious effort to mitigate
a possible backlash by explaining that its actions derived from a
desire to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the
hard-liners who are loathed by many Iranians for their involvement
in repression at home and terrorism abroad. This is a concern that
many Iranians might understand―if not share. And through verbal
and written warnings, military demonstrations, preventive arrests
of Iranian agents, and other measures, the United States should take
steps to deter and/or disrupt Iranian attempts to retaliate.
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IRAN’S RETALIATORY CAPACITY
Should it choose to retaliate, Iran has several options: it could
disrupt oil shipments from the Persian Gulf; attack U.S. Naval assets
in the region; or engage in subversion and terrorism against U.S.
allies and interests.
Iran could disrupt oil exports and shipping in the Gulf. According
to a recently published U.S. defense intelligence assessment, “Iran’s
navy . . . could stem the flow of oil from the Gulf for brief periods
by employing a layered force of diesel-powered KILO submarines,
missile patrol boats, naval mines, and sea and shore-based antiship cruise missiles.”19 It is unclear, however, what Iranian policy
objective would be served by this course of action: such a step would
likely invite reprisals against Iran’s oil production infrastructure
and exports via the Strait of Hormuz (which accounts for about 85
percent of Iran’s foreign exchange earnings), causing grave harm to
Iran’s economy, which is the clerical regime’s “Achilles’ heel.” This
is an option of last resort for Iran, to be used only if denied the use of
the strait, or if other vital interests were threatened.
Likewise, Iran could attack U.S. Naval assets in the Gulf, and
in a surprise attack, it might succeed in inflicting painful losses on
elements of the 5th Fleet (the Naval equivalent of a “sucker punch”).
There can, however, be little doubt that the U.S. riposte would
cripple or destroy Iran’s navy. This would likewise be a risky course
of action for Iran.
Iran’s capacity for terror and subversion remains one of
Tehran’s few levers in the event of a confrontation with the United
States, since―barring the use of chemical or biological weapons―it
otherwise lacks the ability to challenge the United States on anything
near equal terms. In response to U.S. prevention, Iran might sponsor
terrorism in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman―all of
which host important U.S. military facilities―to sow fear among
the Arab Gulf states and cause them to curb U.S. access to military
facilities in the Gulf. And thanks to its ties to the Lebanese Hizballah
(considered by U.S. officials as “the A-Team of terrorism”) and,
more recently, its provision of safe haven and assistance to al-Qaida,
it has the means to launch a bloody terrorist campaign against U.S.
interests in several continents, and in the United States itself.
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Though neither Iran nor Hizballah are known to have directly
targeted U.S. personnel or interests since the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing, Iran is keeping its options open: Iranian agents surveil U.S.
personnel and installations from time to time, and Hizballah retains
a significant presence and support infrastructure in the United States
that could be used to mount terrorist attacks on the United States.20
Moreover, U.S. officials recently claimed that al-Qaida officials in
Iran were involved in the planning for the May 2003 bombings of
three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 25
(not including the nine bombers).21 Thanks to its ties to Hizballah
and al-Qaida, as well as its own intelligence assets, Iran could inspire
or initiate attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East, Europe, South
America, and in the United States, were it to decide to do so.
CONCLUSIONS
For a variety of reasons, the Israeli raid on Osiraq was a unique
case, characterized by conditions that are unlikely to be replicated
again elsewhere. Preventive action by the United States against Iran’s
nuclear program today would have to contend with intelligence,
military-technical, and political challenges more daunting than
those faced by Israel in 1991.
Successful U.S. prevention would require exceptionally complete
intelligence; near flawless military execution; and deft post-strike
diplomacy to mitigate an anti-American nationalist backlash, deter
retaliation, and, most importantly, ensure that military action does
not poison pro-American sentiment or derail the movement for
political change in Iran. The complex, daunting, and somewhat
contradictory nature of these challenges (e.g., successful prevention
could harm short-term prospects for political change and complicate
long-term prospects for rapprochement with a new Iran) only
underscores the importance of exhausting diplomatic options before
giving serious consideration to military action.
Washington, moreover, must supplement these efforts with a
serious push to halt North Korea’s nuclear program and to prevent
North Korea from emerging as a nuclear supplier to Iran, lest North
Korea obtain the means to undo the nonproliferation efforts of the
international community in Iran.
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Nonetheless, preventive action must remain “on the table” as an
option, both as a spur to diplomacy by the international community,
and out of a recognition that there might arise certain circumstances
in the future in which preventive action might become a viable
option: should the United States obtain an intelligence windfall
regarding Iran’s nuclear program that provides it with a complete
and detailed picture of the program; should sabotage/covert
action become possible as a result of the recruitment of well-placed
agents; or should Iran be found responsible for encouraging or
commissioning an act of anti-U.S. terrorism that results in significant
loss of U.S. life. Under such circumstances, the United States might
be inclined to hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, as part of a broader
retaliatory action against terrorist-related facilities in Iran.
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